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  REFORMS AND COUNTER- REFORMS IN BOLIVIA 
 
1.  Background and Introduction 
Towards the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, Bolivia experienced a period of 
deep economic and political crisis, resulting from the international economic shocks that hit the 
country at the time and from the large levels of foreign indebtedness the country had acquired 
during the 1970s. The crisis was characterized by hyperinflation, continuous drops in GDP, 
economic uncertainty and political volatility. 
 
Starting in 1985, after a change in government, Bolivia embarked in a comprehensive program 
of  structural  reforms  aimed  at  stabilizing  the  economy  and  at  removing  the  structural 
constraints which precluded faster economic growth and increases in productivity. The reform 
package  was  implemented  over  a  period  of  time  which  began  in  1985  and  lasted  for 
approximately 20 years. The reform policies comprised measures such as the opening  of the 
economy  to  foreign  trade;  price,  exchange  rate  and  interest  rate  liberalizations;  fiscal 
adjustments; central bank independence; instauration of a  financial regulation and supervision 
system; capitalization and privatization of public enterprises; pension reforms; decentralization 
of the public administration; strengthening of key public institutions, (e.g. the internal revenue 
and customs offices, and the national road administration), among the most noticeable. 
 
This reform process was aimed at improving the overall functioning of the economy. The main 
objective  sought  by  policymakers  with  this  wide  ranging  policy  package  was  the  improved 
efficiency in the functioning of different sectors of the economy.  The political framework at the 
time was favorable for the implementation of this efficiency  geared set of policies. Bolivia had 
recovered its democracy in 1982, and political parties and Congress played a fundamental role 
in the Policy Making Process (PMP). Political pacts became paramount in order to guarantee 
governance, which was a necessary condition for the successive administrations to be able to 
implement the reform program.     
 
The  reform  process  produced  some  positive  effects,  such  as  the  consolidation  of 
macroeconomic  stability,  strengthening  of  key  economic  and  political  institutions,  large Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




investment flows from abroad to key sectors of the economy, and the discovery of sizable 
natural gas reserves, which greatly improved the country´s prospects of attaining faster growth 
and development.   
 
At the end of the 1990s, however, due to various coinciding factors, including the international 
financial crisis which hit the country at the time and the widespread perception of the Bolivian 
population  that  the  reform  program  was  not  benefiting  the  poorest  segments  of    society, 
brought about an increased opposition to the reforms, in the form of road blockades, violent 
protests, etc. The street pressure gained power in the PMP, as several policies were imposed 
on the government and Congress by such means. In general, these policies reverted part of 
the reforms implemented during the 1990s. Eventually, the rise to power of the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) reinforced the tendency to consolidate this process of reform reversal. 
 
This paper analyzes the process of reforms and counter reforms witnessed in Bolivia over the 
last two and a half decades, and the effects these processes have had on productivity. In 
addition, the paper discusses the changing nature of the policy  making processes underlying 
the reform and counter reform processes, in terms of the actors who participated in the PMP, 
policy domains, and arenas where the PMP was shaped, and the currencies used by different 
actors in order to press for their demands. Moreover, the paper analyzes the factor underlying 
the changes which took place  in the support given by the population to the reform process.   
 
Chapter 2 focuses on discussing the trends followed by overall and sectoral productivity in the 
country. Emphasis is placed on the productivity changes brought about by the reform process. 
The results are analyzed both at the sectoral and regional levels. 
 
Chapter 3 describes and analyzes the PMP over time, highlighting the changing nature of this 
process across the period covered in this research. The dynamic changes occurred in terms of 
actors, arenas, mechanisms/currencies and policy domains are discussed. 
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Chapter 4 identifies the factors which determined the political support received by the reform 
process over time, and the shifts in which affected that support. The significance of some of 
these factors is tested econometrically. 
 
Chapter 5 sets forth some of the lessons learned from this research, which could help  devise 
a more inclusive and sustainable PMP in the future. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Reforms, Counter-reforms and Productivity Performance in Bolivia 
 
2.1. Key macroeconomic events 
 
At the beginning of the 1980s, due to the international economic crisis, Bolivia witnessed the 
collapse of the state led development model, which had been in place since the 1952 national 
revolution. The crisis was  characterized  by  a significant  and  continuous  drop in per capita 
GDP, hyperinflation, large fiscal and external imbalances, high rates of unemployment, low 
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Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 
(Annual average)  
1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2007
GDP growth (% change)  2.35 1.81 4.20 3.89 2.53 4.82
Per capita GDP growth (% change)  3.92 0.15 1.52 0.58 0.16 1.43
Inflation rate (% change) 2199.58 26.54 11.08 5.12 3.37 8.34
Devaluation rate (% change) 1844.39 46.65 8.74 5.19 5.51  1.28
Current account balance (% of GDP)  8.3  3.4  4.8  6.2 0.7 12.4
Overall fiscal balance (% of GDP)  16.0  5.3  3.9  3.5  6.3 3.1
Investment rate (% of GDP) 10.2 12.0 14.7 19.1 13.8 14.3
FDI (million US$) 29.5 36.1 167.1 740.1 272.8 239.0
Open unemployment rate (% of labor force) 13.51 15.06 4.84 5.49 7.54 7.83
Labor productivity growth (% change)  4.15  1.02 1.00 2.51  0.87 0.03
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, National Institute of Statistics (INE), Unidad de  





This  critical  situation  led  the  newly elected  government  of  President  Paz  Estenssoro,  to 
undertake a wide ranging set of policies aimed not only at stabilizing the economy, but also at 
laying down the foundations for a new development model based on private initiative and on 
market forces as the main mechanism to allocate resources within the economy. The policy 
package, known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) comprised fiscal adjustment, tax reform, a 
devaluation of the official exchange rate aimed at unifying the foreign exchange market, price 
liberalization  of  public  goods  and  services,  international  trade  liberalization,  widespread 
interest rate and financial liberalizations. 
     
The NEP was successful in stabilizing the economy. Inflation was reduced significantly in the 
second  half  of  the  1980s,  and  stayed  low  throughout  the  1990s.  Fiscal  and  external 
disequilibria were significantly reduced, and growth was restored, albeit at a moderate rate. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




The open unemployment rate was also reduced, due to the large creation of informal low paid 





Despite the positive effects of the NEP, higher growth rates continued to be elusive, due in 
part to the extremely low investment rates. Investment rates had partially recovered from the 
extremely low levels attained during the economic crisis, but stood below 15% of GDP, on 
average, during the first half of the 1990s. To overcome the low investment low growth trap, 
starting  in  1993  the  government  of  Gonzalo  Sanchez  de  Lozada  carried  out  a  profound 
process of structural reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the overall functioning of the 
Bolivian State and, thus, removing the bottlenecks which were constraining Bolivia´s growth 
and  development  prospects.  The  reform  process  comprised  a  wide ranging  set  of  policies 
including the partial privatization of the main state enterprises (capitalization reform), pension 
reform,  decentralization  of  the  public  administration  through  popular  participation  and 
decentralization  reforms,  education  and  land  reforms,  central  bank  independence, 
strengthening of key public institutions, such as the internal revenue and customs offices, civil 
service programs, regulatory and supervisory frameworks for the financial and non financial 
sectors. 
 
These  economic  reforms  were  accompanied  by  social  policies,  aimed  at  alleviating  and 
reducing poverty and improving income distribution. Among the most important social reforms 
were:  i.  The  Bonosol;  a  universal  for life,  non contributive  pension  scheme,  paid  to  all 
Bolivians over 65 years of age, amounting to US$ 248 per year. The Bonosol was financed 
with  the  resources  obtained  from  the  capitalization  process,  and  constituted  the  social 
dimension of that process. ii) A national health insurance for mother and child, providing free 
medical attention to pregnant women until childbirth, and for the children until they reached the 
age of five, covering diarrheic and respiratory illnesses; iii. Health insurance for the elderly, 
which  provides  free  medical  attention  to  senior  citizens  over  65  years  of  age;  iv.  The 
decentralization law (Participación Popular) mentioned above, assigned 20% of all national Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




revenues  to  municipalities  to  be  spent  mainly  on  education  and  health  infrastructure.  The 
distribution  of  these  resources  among  municipalities  is  made  on  a  per capita  basis.  The 
Participación  Popular  allocated  resources  to  municipalities  which  had  previously  been 
neglected, avoiding the discretionary allocation of public resources geographically, and thus 
ending the social patronage that had prevailed until then. 
 
In the political sphere, there were major efforts to improve the political representation of the 
population.  The  reforms  implemented  were:  i.  Introduction  of  sixty  two  “uninominal” 
circumscriptions, in which deputies were elected by direct vote. The remaining 68 deputies 
remained elected from a list which accompanied the Presidential candidate (“pluri nominal”); ii. 
The electoral law was also modified, creating a public financing scheme for political parties, 
and  establishing  a  mandatory  quota  for  women  in  the  list  of  candidates  for  deputies  and 
senators. 
 
In  the  Judicial  System,  efforts  were  made  in  order  to  increase  the  rule  of  law,  by  the 
establishment of a Constitutional Control Court, to keep watch at the constitutionality of laws, 
decrees and  any  non judicial  resolutions,  among others;  and by  the creation  of  a judiciary 
council  as  an  administrative  and  disciplinary  body  for  the  judicial  system;  and  the 
establishment of the institution of the Ombudsman (“Defensor del Pueblo”). 
 
 
The Capitalization reform 
Amongst  the  many  reforms  implemented  during  the  reform  period  aimed  at  increasing 
productivity,  perhaps,  the  most  emblematic  was  the  capitalization  of  the  largest  public 
enterprises. The overall diagnostic of the Bolivian public enterprises before the reform process 
was  that  they  were  greatly  undercapitalized,  over indebted,  and  technologically  backward. 
Thus,  the  reform  process  placed  great  emphasis  on  creating  the  legal  and  institutional 
conditions which would maximize investment flows and technology transfer to these sectors. 
The  capitalization  reform  was  a  two pronged  reform,  comprising:  i)  the  creation  of  a  new 
institutional  and  regulatory  framework  for  the  functioning  of  each  of  the  sectors  where Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




capitalized public enterprises  operated;  and  ii)  the partial  privatization  of the largest public 
enterprises through the issue of  new shares to be bought by strategic investors.  
 
The capitalization reform was successful in bringing about large increases in investment flows, 
not  only  to  the  capitalized  sectors,  previously  in  the  hands  of  the  State,  but  also  to  other 
sectors  of  the  economy,  especially  in  the  form  of  FDI.  The  largest  FDI  flows  went  to  the 
hydrocarbons, telecommunications, electricity and financial services, and to a lesser extent to 
the  agroindustrial  sectors.  Moreover,  the  strategic  partners  who  invested  in the  capitalized 
sectors, not only through the capitalized public enterprises but also as separate investments 
encouraged by the new institutional environment, were large transnational corporations, with 
great financial capabilities and sectoral experience worldwide. This was an intended policy, 
because large transnational companies, unlike domestic ones, had the capacity to bring large 
capital investment flows into the economy and produce transfers of the latest technology into 
these sectors.  
 
However, the capitalization process, although successful in bringing about large increases in 
investment  inflows,  which  was  the  intended  objective,  overlooked  some  elements  which 
eventually put in jeopardy the long term sustainability of the reform. 
 
Eventually, these factors perceived as negative by large segments of the population, coupled 
with the international crisis at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning second millennium, 
gained widespread support for leaders who advocated for the reversal of the market oriented 
reform program. 
 
From 2001 onwards, the country witnessed a succession of policy measures which reversed 
the  reforms,  including  the  withdrawal  of  public  service  concessions,  nationalization  of 
capitalized enterprises,  and restrictions imposed on the functioning of the labor market. These 
measures tended to have significant political returns in the short  run, but have also brought 
about a significant drop in investment inflows, which eventually are expected to bring about 
productivity losses in the long run.   
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2.2. Productivity performance over time 
 
In the long run, productivity in Bolivia has remained low and stagnated. Graph 2.1 shows time 
series for the physical capital stock per worker (capital deepening) and labor productivity (GDP 
per worker) for the period 1970 2006. As can be observed, the very low levels of fixed capital 
formation the country exhibited over time have resulted in low and stagnant levels of physical 
capital per worker, which over this long period averaged US$ 5, 700 in constant 2007 values, 
and  fluctuated  within  a  relatively  narrow  range.  Investment  levels  were  barely  sufficient  to 
replace the depreciation of existing capital and to supply with capital to new entrants into the 
labor market, but did not permit any increase in the physical capital per worker ratio. As a 
result, labor  productivity  has  remained  largely  stagnant  over time, averaging  US$  2,800 in 
constant 2007 values. Therefore, economic growth has been exclusively the result of factor 
accumulation, and the contribution of TFP growth to GDP growth has been almost negligible. 
 
Graph 2.1 
Capital deepening and labor productivity 













































Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
 
Graph 2.2 shows a long term production function for the Bolivian economy, which plots the 
physical capital stock per worker (k) and total output per worker (y). The Graph shows that 
Bolivia´s long term steady state growth has remained almost invariable over the last 36 years. 
To  produce  a  significant  increase  in  the  long term  steady state  growth  path,  the  Bolivian Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




economy needs to increase its investment rate significantly and permanently, and to generate 
permanent productivity gains by increasing its TFP. 
 
Graph 2.2 
Long term production function 



























Source: Own Estimates based on National Accounts data published by  
 the National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
 
Productivity behavior is closely linked to the performance of investment over time. Historically, 
the Bolivian economy has exhibited very low investment rates, due to various factors, such as 
low  savings  rates,  foreign  exchange  constraints,  unstable  and  unfavorable  investment 
environment, all due to political uncertainty and an inadequate institutional environment. Low 
investment  rates  have  been  a  crucial  factor  to  explain  low  productivity  growth.  Investment 
rates on average amounted to 13.9% of GDP for the period 1970 2007 (see Graph 2.3). Only 
sporadically, has investment been situated above 15% of GDP and only in one single year 
(1998) it surpassed 20% of GDP. At these low rates, the economy could barely replace the 
depreciated capital and supply new entrants to the labor force with physical capital, but could 
not increase the capital endowment per worker.  Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 






Investment rate for the Bolivian economy 



















Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, National Institute of Statistics (INE), 
 Unidad de Programación Fiscal (UPF) 
 
 
During the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, investment rates went down from 
16.7% of GDP in 1978 to 9.4% in 1984. The economic crisis imposed several constraints on 
investment, ranging from foreign exchange shortages to the deterioration of the investment 
climate. 
 
After the stabilization program was implemented in 1985, investment rates partially recovered, 
increasing up to 15.8% of GDP in 1993, due to the improved macroeconomic and investment 
climate. However, investment rates stood at levels that were completely insufficient to attain a 
rapid growth in the long run.  
 
The  implementation  of  the  second generation  structural  reforms  placed  much  greater 
emphasis  on  bringing  about  a  large  boost  to  private  investment,  especially  to  foreign 
investment. The latter was expected to bring about not only a large increase in investment 
inflows, but also to produce a significant jump in the technological endowment of key sectors 
of  the  economy,  such  as  hydrocarbons,  telecommunications,  electric  energy,  and Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




transportation. As a result of the reforms, the overall investment rate increased up to 23.6% of 
GDP in 1998.  
 
Finally, during the reform reversal period, the investment rate plummeted again to 13.3% of 
GDP in 2005, due to the economic crisis and the sharp deterioration of the investment climate. 
In 2007, the investment rate rose up again to 15% of GDP, but mainly due to an increased 
public investment, whose impact on productivity is unclear. Private investment on the other 
hand, domestic and foreign, remained largely stagnant due to the existing political volatility 
and the nationalization policies undertaken by the government of Evo Morales. 
 
Growth accounting of productivity 
The investment patterns discussed in the previous section have had an important impact on 
productivity behavior. Based on standard growth accounting analysis, Graph 2.4 shows that 
during the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, labor productivity decreased at an 
average annual rate of 3.6%, mainly due to a sharp drop in TFP, which went down at an 
average yearly rate of 3.2%. The contribution of capital stock per worker to productivity growth 
was small despite the decrease in the investment rate, due to the increased unemployment 
which shrank the number of people participating in the labor force. 
 
Graph 2.4 
Contribution to growth of TFP and capital accumulation 
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Source: Own estimates based on National Accounts data  
 published by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





After the stabilization program was implemented in 1985, productivity growth went down, but 
at  a much slower  pace ( 0.57%  on  average between  1985  and  1990). There  was a  small 
upturn in TFP (0.7% annual growth on average), after the significant drop experienced at the 
beginning of the decade. However, the negative growth rate in capital per worker contributed 
negatively to labor productivity, by an average yearly rate of 1.28%. Despite the increased 
investment rates, capital endowment per worked declined due to an enlarged participation of 
the population in the labor force, resulting from the diminished unemployment rates.  
 
During the first half of the 1990s, labor productivity grew at an average rate of 0.88%, basically 
due to the raise in TFP, which went up at an average annual rate of 1.16%. During that period, 
the  capital  per  worker  ratio  went  down,  contributing  negatively  to  productivity  growth  by  a 
0.28% annual growth rate, caused by relatively low investment rates and lower unemployment. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, productivity increased at its fastest growth rate, 2.07% per 
year.  The  bulk  of  this  increase  is  explained  by  the  higher  rates of  capital  endowment  per 
worker. The capital per worker ratio went up by an average yearly rate of 2.65% during this 
period, due to the positive effects of the structural reforms on FDI inflows. TFP on the other 
hand, presented negative growth rates, of 0.58% per year on average. 
 
In  the  first  half  of  the  2000s,  productivity  growth  became  negative  again,  because  the 
economic crisis slowed down GDP growth and generated a large excess capacity, decreasing 
productivity  at  a  yearly  average  rate  of  0.1%,  between  2000  and  2005.  The  drop  in  the 
investment rate, resulting from the economic and political crisis Bolivia experienced during this 
period,  caused  a  negative  contribution  of  capital  per  worker  to  productivity  growth,  by  an 
average annual rate of 0.44%. TFP presented a small growth rate of 0.35% a year on average.  
 
This trend continued through 2007. Labor productivity dropped at an average growth rate of 
0.08% per year, despite the recovery in GDP growth observed during these two years. The 
larger employment absorption occurred, of previously unemployed workers, explains the low 
productivity growth rate. On the other hand, low rates resulted in a negative contribution of Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




capital per worker to productivity growth of 1.61% per year on average. TFP increased at an 
annual growth rate of 1.54%, mirroring the positive lagged effects which investment flows of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s had on productivity. 
 
 
2.3. Sectoral and regional performance of productivity 
This section discusses the sectoral and regional impacts of the reforms. Data on direct foreign 
investment by sector, sectoral labor productivity, real wages, labor distribution across sectors, 
and GDP share by sector are used to perform the analysis. The aim is to analyze the impact of 
the  reform  process  on  the  functioning  of  reformed  and  non reformed  sectors,  on  sectoral 
productivity and on inequality gaps. 
 
A similar discussion is carried out at the regional level. The effects of the reforms on regional 
GDP growth and per capita incomes are analyzed. To this end, data on regional per capita 
GDP, poverty incidence, GDP growth, and resource transfers to regions are presented. 
 
Sectoral Impacts of the Reforms 
Some  of the  reforms implemented in the  1990s, and  especially  the capitalization  of public 
enterprises, sought to bring about an investment shock into key sectors of the economy, by 
obtaining the companies’ commitment to increase investment flows in the capitalized firms. 
However,  the  capitalization  and  other  reforms  favored  and  promoted  increases  in  foreign 
investment  flows  to  non labor  intensive  sectors  (namely,  hydrocarbons,  energy, 
telecommunications  and  financial  services).  Between  1996  and  2003,  FDI  flows  to  capital 
intensive sectors amounted  to US$ 621 million per year, on average. FDI flows to extractive 
activities,  especially  hydrocarbons,  amounted    to  US$  368.3  million  per  year,  on  average. 
Between 1996 and 2004, GDP in the hydrocarbon sector almost doubled, increasing at an 
annual  rate  of  8.5%  during  that  period,  on  average.  Other  sectors  which  benefited  from 
important FDI flows were transportation and communications which received annual average 
flows of US$ 150.6 million. FDI flows to the electricity, gas and water sectors were of about 
US$ 57.7 million per year, on average. Finally, the banking sector received FDI flows of about Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




US$ 39.7 million per year. Large FDI flows brought about sharp labor productivity increases in 
these sectors (Graph 2.5 and Table 2.2). 
 
Graph 2.5 
FDI Flows by Sector 




















Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
 
Conversely,  the  reform  program  did  not  place  equal  attention  on  labor intensive  sectors. 
These sectors, which employ 90% of the total labor force, lagged behind non labor intensive 
sectors in terms of GDP growth, productivity and real incomes. As a result, large disparities in 
labor  productivity  developed  among  labor  and  non labor  intensive  sectors  in  terms  of 
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Reforms and Productivity Differences across Sectors  
Labour  Share in  total Share in total Labour Average  Average
Intensity employment GDP Productivity monthly  FDI flows
(workers per  2003 2003 (output per income 1996-2003
Sectors unit of output) (%) (%) worker) (Bs. 1991) (million US$)
Labour intensive sectors 306,3 90,2 53,1 3,3 281 202,4
Construction 452,2 7,3 2,9 2,2 513 110,0
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 448,6 39,3 15,8 2,2 144 0,5
Community, social and personal services 420,3 11,3 4,8 2,4 480 0,0
Commerce 330,6 16,2 8,8 3,0 420 18,5
Restaurant and hotel 298,3 5,4 3,3 3,4 391 4,2
Manufacturing industry 111,6 10,8 17,5 9,0 394 69,2
Non-labour intensive sectors 45,0 9,8 46,9 26,5 867 621,7
Transport, storage and communication 69,7 4,6 11,8 14,3 706 150,6
Business services 39,4 2,1 9,5 25,4 982 5,4
Public Administration 35,2 1,9 9,8 28,4 950 0,0
Electricity, gas and water 32,7 0,4 2,2 30,6 1107 57,7
Financial services 16,5 0,3 3,7 60,5 1677 39,7
Mining and hydrocarbons 10,1 0,6 10,0 98,8 828 368,3
Total 180,4 100 100 5,5 381 824,2 
Source: Own estimates based on National Accounts data and Household Surveys published by 
the National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
 
 
In  2003,  productivity  in  labor intensive  sectors  was  only  12%  of  that  exhibited  in  capital 
intensive ones. Labor productivity was extremely low in construction and agriculture. On the 
other  hand,  manufacturing  presented  the  highest  productivity  levels  among  labor  intensive 
activities.  In  terms  of  real  incomes,  between  1996  and  2003,  workers  engaged  in  labor 
intensive sectors earned, on average, an equivalent of 32% of the amount earned by workers 
in non labor intensive sectors. Agricultural workers received the lowest income levels, while 
workers engaged in construction activities benefited from the highest among labor intensive 
sectors. 
 
Regional Impacts of the Reforms 
The reform policies implemented during the 1990s were not regionally biased, in principle . 
However, the reforms were supported/opposed more in some regions than in others. Perhaps, 
the  reform  outcomes  eventually  benefitted  some  regions  more  than  others,  reinforcing  the 
negative or positive perception different regions had about the reform process benefits. For 
instance, FDI arising from the capitalization reform poured more intensely into regions located 
in  the  eastern  lowlands  which  had  historically  favored  a  free market  model.  The  opposite Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




seems to occur in the western highlands, where there is a much larger incidence of public 
sector activities and employment.   
 
Graph 2.6 




















Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.3 and Graph 2.6, FDI flows resulting from the capitalization process 
and the sectoral reforms, arrived in larger quantities to regions in the eastern lowlands (US$ 
459 million a year, on average, between 1996 and 2005), such as Santa Cruz and Tarija. The 
regions in the western highlands also received FDI flows but in relatively smaller quantities 
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Reforms and Productivity Differences across Regions  
 
Share in Total Share in Total Per capita GDP growth Poverty Average FDI Copart.+HIPC
Population (%) GDP (%) GDP (US$) 1990-2006 Incidence % (million US$) (million US$)
     Chuquisaca 6,4% 4,5% 809,2 1,43 70,1% 21,9 14,8
     La Paz 28,4% 24,0% 996,9 2,63 66,2% 118,7 61,3
     Cochabamba 17,6% 16,1% 1.043,4 3,26 55,0% 103,8 36,6
     Oruro 4,7% 4,8% 1.213,9 2,89 67,8% 11,7 11,1
     Potosí 8,6% 5,0% 711,1 2,28 79,7% 37,2 20,7
Average Highlands 65,7% 54,3% 954,89 2,50 67,8% 293,2 144,5
     Tarija 4,7% 12,9% 3.033,2 8,29 50,8% 127,2 10,0
     Santa Cruz 24,5% 28,9% 1.300,5 4,30 38,0% 325,7 47,0
     Beni 4,4% 3,0% 814,3 2,73 76,0% 6,5 9,8
     Pando 0,6% 0,9% 1.365,9 4,90 72,4% 0,4 1,8
Average Lowlands 34,3% 45,7% 1.628,48 5,06 59,3% 459,9 68,7
    BOLIVIA 100,0% 100,0% 1.152,5 3,59 58,5% 753,0 213,2 
Source: Own  estimates  based  on  National  Accounts  data,  Household  Surveys  published  by  the 
National  Institute  of  Statistics  (INE),  and  Fiscal  Balance  data  published  by  the  Unidad  de 
Programación Fiscal (UPF) 
 
 
The  fact  that  regions  in  the  eastern  lowlands  had  favored  market oriented  policies  is  also 
linked to other socio economic indicators which can contribute to explain why certain regions 
tended to oppose/favor market oriented reforms. For instance, regions in the eastern lowlands 
have a per capita GDP that is 70% higher, on average, than those in the western highlands. 
The GDP average growth rate during the 1990 2006 period for regions located in the eastern 
lowlands doubled the rates observed in western highlands. Poverty incidence is also higher in 
the western regions (67.8%) than in the eastern regions (59.3%). Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 






Political Support by Regions 






Source: Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
These  indicators  show  that  regional  socio economic  imbalances  in  Bolivia  could  help  to 
explain the differences in the political support which market oriented reforms have had across 
regions. The much wealthier eastern lowlands have tended to support political parties that 
were more identified with market oriented reforms. The opposite tends to occur in the much 
poorer western highlands. Graph 2.7 shows that these political preferences have remained 
unchanged over time. In the 1980 elections, the left wing party UDP, which favored a state led 
economy, obtained a majority of votes in the western regions, while the center right wing party 
MNR, which pioneered the reform process, won in the eastern regions. This pattern can also 
be observed in the 2005 general elections, when the left wing party MAS won in the western 
highlands, while the right wing party PODEMOS won in the eastern lowlands regions.   
 
Although  the  reform  process  placed  a  great  emphasis  on  policies  aimed  at  enhancing 
productivity, policies also focused on distributive objectives. The Popular Participation Reform 
for instance, transferred  20% of the total national tax revenues to municipalities across the 
country, amounting to about US$ 190 million, on average, during the period from 1994 to 2007 Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




period (Graph 2.8). Starting in 2001, transfers to municipalities were increased within the HIPC 
debt relief initiative by US$ 45.7 million per year on average for the period 2001 2007. 
 
Graph 2.8 
Resource Transfers to Municipalities 






















Source: Unidad de Programación Fiscal (UPF) 
 
 
As can be observed in Table 2.3, regions in the western part of the country received larger 
amount of resources than regions in the eastern part. This shows that although the reform 
process also included policies aimed at attaining a more equal distribution of resources among 
regions, they were insufficient to change regional support for the reforms. 
 
 
3.  Policy-making Process 
This chapter analyses the dynamic nature of the PMP in Bolivia over the period covered in this 
research study. Annex A describes the main actors which participated in the PMP, the arenas 
where  the  PMP  was  shaped,  and  the  currencies  used  by  actors  to  press  for  their  socio 
economic demands. In this chapter, all these elements and concepts are combined in order to 
portray the dynamics of the Bolivian PMP.   
 Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




Politics  have  played  an  extremely  important  role  in  shaping  the  PMP  in  Bolivia  and 
consequently its economic behavior. The PMP, however, has experienced significant changes 
over time, in terms of the socio economic and political players involved, the arenas where the 
PMP process took place and the various currencies used by the different players, as well as 
their policy objectives. During the 1980s and 1990s, traditional political parties played the most 
important role in the PMP. During the 2000s, however, economic policy has been, to a great 
extent,  the  result  of  social  and  political  pressures  that  have  had  a  significant  impact  on 
productivity. The following sections explain the dynamic of the PMP in Bolivia over the past 25 
years. The PMP matrix which outlines the PMP flux over time is presented in Annex B. 
 
As discussed previously, in order to capture the changes occurred in the PMP over time, and 
the factors underlying these changes, the discussion on the PMP process will be divided into 
three  periods  which  were  characterized  by  essentially  different  traits:  the  reform  process, 
reform fatigue and reform reversal periods. 
 
3.1. PMP during the Reform Process 
 
After  the  return  of  democracy  in  1982,  the  Legislative  branch  played  a  paramount  role  in 
Bolivia’s  PMP.  In  the  first  half  of  the  1980s,  Bolivia  suffered  a  profound  economic  crisis 
characterized  by  continuous  reductions  in  GDP  and  hyperinflation.  The  government  of 
President  Siles  Suazo  (1982 1985)  lacked  the  political  support  in  Congress  required  to 
implement  a  coherent  economic  program.  His  ruling  left wing  party,  Unidad  Democrática 
Popular  (UDP)  only  controlled  36.3%  of  total  Congress  members,  while  opposition  parties 
controlled the remaining 63.7% (Table 3.1). In 1985, President Siles Suazo realized that he 
was unable to cope with the economic, social and political crisis, and decided to shorten his 
mandate, calling for early general elections one year ahead of the constitutional end of his 
mandate. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





Congressional Composition during the Reform Process 
(Number and percentage of Congress members) 
Parties MPs % Parties MPs % Parties MPs % Parties MPs % Parties MPs % Parties MPs % Parties MPs %
Government
UDP 57 36.3% MNR 59 37.6% ADN 46 29.3% MNR 69 43.9% ADN 44 28.0% MNR 46 29.3% MAS 84 53.5%
ADN 51 32.5% MIR 41 26.1% UCS 21 13.4% MIR 31 19.7% MIR 31 19.7%
Condepa 11 7.0% MBL 7 4.5% UCS 23 14.6% NFR 27 17.2%
Condepa 20 12.7% UCS 5 3.2%
Total Congress Control 57 36.3% 110 70.1% 98 62.4% 97 61.8% 118 75.2% 109 69.4% 84 53.5%
Oposition
MNR 44 28.0% MIR 16 10.2% MNR 49 31.2% AP 43 27.4% MNR 31 19.7% MAS 35 22.3% Podemos 56 35.7%
ADN 30 19.1% MNRI 8 5.1% IU 10 6.4% Condepa 14 8.9% IU 4 2.5% MIP 7 4.5% MNR 8 5.1%
PS 1 11 7.0% VR 9A 6 3.8% ARBOL 1 0.6% MBL 4 2.5% ADN 5 3.2% UN 9 5.7%
PDC 5 3.2% PS 1 5 3.2% EJE 1 0.6% PS 1 0.6%
FSB 3 1.9% IU 4 2.5% VSB 1 0.6%
PRA 3 1.9% PDC 3 1.9%
MNR U 2 1.3% FSB 3 1.9%
MITKA 1 0.6% MRTKL 2 1.3%
MITKA 1 1 0.6%
Total Congress Control 100 63.7% 47 29.9% 59 37.6% 60 38.2% 39 24.8% 48 30.6% 73 46.5%
Total Congress 157 100.0% 157 100.0% 157 100.0% 157 100.0% 157 100.0% 157 100.0% 157 100.0%
First Two Parties 64.3% 70.1% 60.5% 71.3% 30.6% 33.8% 89.2%
Government Coalition
  Congressional Control 57 36.3% 110 70.1% 98 62.4% 97 61.8% 118 75.2% 109 69.4% 84 53.5%
    Upper Chamber 10 37.0% 26 96.3% 18 66.7% 18 66.7% 22 81.5% 17 63.0% 12 44.4%
    Lower Chamber 47 36.2% 84 64.6% 80 61.5% 79 60.8% 96 73.8% 92 70.8% 72 55.4%
  Number of Parties 1 2 3 3 4 4 1
1980-85 1985-89 1989-93 1993-97 1997-02 2002-05 2005-
 
Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
 
After the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1985, the newly elected government of 
President  Paz  Estenssoro  had  the  urgent  task  to  put  an  end  to  the  economic  crisis  and 
stabilize  the  economy.  For  this  purpose,  the  new  administration  unveiled  an  economic 
package comprised of a wide range of reforms aimed not only at stabilizing the economy, but 
also at laying down the basis for a new development model based on the private initiative and 
on the market as the main mechanism to allocate resources within the economy. 
 
One fundamental lesson the new administration had learned from its predecessors was that in 
order to conduct a coherent economic program, the government needed political governance, 
based on a strong political party coalition. This would permit the government to control an 
essential majority of Congress members, both in the Upper and Lower Chambers, in order to 
pass  the laws  required  to  implement  its  policies.  Thus,  the  government  of  the  Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) formed a coalition with the right wing Acción Democratica 
Nacionalista (ADN), named as “Pacto por la Democracia” (Pact for Democracy). The alliance 
provided the government with a 70.1% control of Congress members, the essential majority Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




required to  implement a  successful  stabilization  program  which  would  bring inflation  down, 
restore macroeconomic equilibriums and reestablish economic growth.  
 
Given the urgent need the administration had to cope with the economic crisis, the stabilization 
policies were put into effect by means of a Supreme Decree (SD 21060), which did not require 
a Congressional approval. The stabilization program was based on widespread budget cuts, 
freeze of public servants salaries, price liberalization of public goods and services, including 
fuels, and a rationalization of public employment. Despite the hardness of the program, the 
NEP  was  eventually  accepted  by  the  population,  due  to  the  strong  demand  for  economic 
stability the Bolivian society had at the time. 
 
The strategy of forming coalitions in order to guarantee governance was also followed during 
the next administration of President Paz Zamora, who despite having obtained a third position 
in the national elections, was elected President and remained in power between 1989 and 
1993  thanks  to  an  agreement  with  the  party  which  had  achieved  a  second  place  in  that 
election (ADN). The governance pact was agreed upon between ADN (right wing) and the 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) (left wing). The so called “Acuerdo Patriótico” 
(Patriotic Accord) granted the new coalition a 62.4% control of Congress members, a  majority 
sufficient  to  approve  key  laws  to  implement  its  policies.  Basically,  the  Acuerdo  Patriótico 
administration continued the policies initiated in 1985, aimed at maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, but did not deepen the structural reforms process. 
 
The coalition strategy was also resorted to during the first administration of President Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada (1993 2007), who had obtained a landslide victory in the 1993 elections 
as a candidate for the MNR party. Notwithstanding, the winning party formed a government 
coalition with Unión Cívica Solidaridad (UCS) and the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), which 
allowed it to count on a significant Congressional majority, controlling 61.8% of the Congress 
seats.  Based  on  this  Congressional  majority,  the  administration  guaranteed  the  necessary 
support in order to implement the wide ranging set of structural reforms that had been part of 
the MNR’s electoral platform, known as the Plan de Todos (Plan for Everyone) during the 
presidential campaign. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





During the 1990s, Bolivia enjoyed a period with a relatively stable political and institutional 
environment.  The  continuity  of  the  stabilization  policies  applied  had  successfully  brought 
inflation down and restored economic growth. The structural reforms were the main concern of 
the policy agenda at the time, and policies were implemented through sectoral laws which 
were passed by Congress majorities. The reform process enjoyed the support of part of the 
entrepreneurial sector, international financial organizations and the international community of 
donors. The  democratic  alternation in  power,  had  apparently given  the  reform process the 
required  political  support  which  would  guarantee  the  long term  sustainability  of  market 
oriented reforms. 
 
The sectors which opposed the reforms, such as trade unions, social movements and left wing 
political parties had been politically weakened by the economic and social crisis lived during 
the UDP government. Moreover, the world collapse of the socialist block in 1989 had made the 
socialist  paradigm  questionable  as  a  viable  political  and  economic  alternative,  further 
weakening the position of left wing parties in the country. Furthermore, the 1990s witnessed 
the  implementation  of  market oriented  reforms  across  the  globe,  and  across  the  Latin 
American  region,  within  the  overall  umbrella  of  the  Washington  Consensus.  Bolivia  had 
somehow pioneered the reform process and, thus, the political party system perceived the 
reform process was moving in the right direction. 
 
3.2. Reform Paralysis 
Politically,  the  coalition  system  proved  to  be  a  very  effective  mechanism  to  assure 
governance, which was a necessary condition to maintain democratic and economic stability, 
and  to  move  ahead  with  the  reform  process.  The  reform  process  experienced  significant 
advances during the 1985 1989 and 1993 1997 administrations, and slowed down during the 
1989 1993 government. However, the reform process came to an almost complete halt during 
the different administrations that ruled the country after 1997. This was a period characterized 
by  significant  changes  in  the  PMP,  the  emergence  of  new  actors  that  began  to  play  an 
important role in determining the PMP, e.g. social movements and regional organizations; the 
occurrence of significant shifts in the arenas where the PMP was formed e.g. from Congress Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




on to the streets; and the beginning of processes of aggregation of policy domains, where 
fragmented  demands  of  various heterogeneous  groups  and  actors  were articulated  around 
wider and more aggregative policy objectives, e.g. the reversal of market oriented reforms.     
 
The coalition system had become exhausted over time. The high degree of dispersion in the 
electoral  voting  made  increasingly  difficult  to  form  a  coherent  coalition,  since  it  became 
necessary to include a larger number of political parties into the alliance in order to attain 
congressional control. Table 3.1 above shows how the process of dispersion in the electoral 
vote occurred over time. The 1985 1989 coalition was formed with only two political parties 
which guaranteed 70.1% control of total Congress seats. In the 2002 elections, however, the 
government  coalition  was  formed  with  4  political  parties  which  guaranteed  only  a  69.4% 
control of Congress seats. Perhaps, the 1993 1997 government coalition was the last formed 
around a coherent government program. 
 
Over time, the population vote became more and more disperse, making it increasingly difficult 
to assemble diverse political parties within a coherent government alliance with a unified and 
consistent  government  program.  Thus,  in  1997,  the  elected  government  of  General  Hugo 
Banzer had difficulties in forming its government coalition, needing to include four different 
parties  within  the  alliance,  with  not  necessarily  the  same  vision  or  programmatic  agenda. 
Additionally,  Banzer’s  administration  was  confronted  with  numerous  political  and  social 
conflicts, resulting from a variety of sectoral demands. Furthermore, the government embarked 
in a tough program to eradicate coca crops in the Chapare region, located in the central part of 
Bolivia. The program brought about violent protests against the government policies, in the 
form of road blockades, hurting local producers badly and damaging productivity. Amid the 
political  crisis,  Bolivia  began  experiencing  the  effects  of  the  international  economic  crisis, 
which resulted in slower economic growth and higher unemployment. 
 
The political, economic and social crises deepened during Sánchez de Lozada´s second term, 
which began in 2002, reaching only approximately 22% of the electoral votes. This time, his 
government coalition was comprised of four political parties, including the President’s MNR. By 
then, social and political volatility had increased to unmanageable levels, and after a series of Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




political and social conflicts he was forced to resign from the presidency. The government was 
unable to implement its policies to cope with the economic and political crisis, not because of a 
lack  of  the  needed  congressional  majority,  but  rather,  due  to  the  violent  street  opposition 
staged  by  social movements and  trade  unions  through  road  blockades  and  other  types  of 
violent  demonstrations.  Congress  became  less  predominant  in  determining  the  PMP, 
surrendering this function to the street forces.      
 
There were various factors which explain the loss of legitimacy of Congress as a main arena in 
the PMP. 
 
First,  the  coalition  system  had  lost  credibility  because  Congressional  coalitions  were 
increasingly formed based on clientelistic objectives, and not on policy programs. In addition, 
the  traditional  political  parties  were  accused  of  covering  up  corruption  cases,  and  lost 
credibility in the eyes of the population. 
 
Second, the social movements and trade unions, the latter grouped within the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB), which had been weakened after the crisis of the 1980s, regained power and 
succeeded in unifying diverse sectoral demands under various ideological banners, such as 
the  recovery  of  the  national  natural  resources  (i.e.  hydrocarbons),  the  defeat  of  the  neo 
conservative model, and opposition to the sale of natural gas to Chile, with whom Bolivia has 
had a territorial dispute dating back to the 19th century. These causes gained support from a 
wide variety of sectors of the Bolivian society due to a number of different factors: 
 
i)  The effects of the international economic crisis began to be felt by the Bolivian 
economy  starting  in  1999,  in  the  form  of  reduced  growth  and  higher 
unemployment. The poorest segments of the population, which were affected 
more deeply by the crisis, blamed the structural reforms and, more generally, 
the  market oriented  model  for  the  negative  effects  which  had  triggered  the 
crises. This was reinforced by the reform fatigue felt by the society as a whole. 
ii)  The economic crisis had also created large macroeconomic imbalances, such 
as  an  increased  fiscal  deficit,  and  the  dependence  on  grants  and  borrowing Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




from the international community to finance them. Some administrations tried to 
implement  unpopular  fiscal  adjustment  measures,  such  as  the  creation  of  a 
personal income tax and fuel price adjustments which brought about riots and 
violent  demonstrations,  undermining  the  government’s  political  and  popular 
support. 
iii)  The zero coca program proposed by the Banzer administration between 1997 
and 2002, comprising the total eradication of coca crops which exceeded the 
traditional domestic consumption, generated strong opposition from the coca 
growing  sector,  which  had  the  possibility  to  block  a  key  export  road  in  the 
middle of the country, deeply hurting the economy. Thus, coca producers, and 
its leader Evo Morales, became paramount in opposing government policies.     
iv)  The Popular Participation and Decentralization reforms implemented during the 
1990s, transferred a large share of the public investment management to local 
governments,  i.e.  municipalities  and  Prefecturas  (departmental  authorities). 
These policies promoted greater social, political and economic participation of 
previously excluded segments of the society, especially of rural citizens. This 
reform  transferred  greater  competences  and resources  to  municipalities,  and 
the capacity to elect their own authorities through direct vote. Thus, historically 
neglected segments of the society acquired a much greater capacity to organize 
themselves  and  press  for  their  demands  through  different  channels  and 
mechanisms, including road blockades. This higher social participation, which 
was promoted by these reforms, brought about a much more conflictive political 
environment, contributing to weaken the political party system. This was neither 
an intended nor foreseen outcome of the reform.  
 
All  the  factors  described  above  contributed  to  create  a  socio political  environment 
characterized by a permanent state of social and political conflict, which was not favorable for 
the  continuity  and  deepening  of  the  reform  process.  The  reform  process  was  almost 
completely halted during this period, as the annual number of conflicts, of diverse nature and 
origin, rose from 156 in 1997 to 654 in 2004 (Graph 3.1). The economic crisis of the first half of 
the 2000s had reduced employment and income opportunities, hurting the poorest segments Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




of the society the most. The increased discontent paved the road for sectors and actors which 
opposed  the  reform  process  and  called  for  their  reversal,  gaining  support  for  them  from 
different segments of the population.  
 
Graph 3.1 
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3.3. Reversal of the Reforms 
The loss of legitimacy by Congress brought about significant changes in the PMP, in terms of 
actors,  arenas  and  currencies.  The  most  noticeable  change  was  that  the  PMP  was  now 
determined  mostly  by  the  street  forces  rather  than  by  Congress.  The  referendums  also 
became  another  key  vehicle  in  the  policymaking  process,  like  the  2004  Referendum  to 
approve a change in the hydrocarbon sector policy. Social sectors acquired great power and 
influence  over  the  policymaking  process,  by  exerting  pressure  on  the  government  through 
road blockades, strikes, demonstrations, protest marches, etc. Thus, a phenomenon, which 
this research project terms as a “political substitution across policy domains and across policy 
arenas”, actually took place in Bolivia during that period. The so called social movements and 
their leaders were able to articulate fragmented sectoral demands from various heterogeneous 
groups,  such  as  salaried  and  self employed  workers,  coca  growers,  neighborhood Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




organizations, peasants, landless movements, etc. under common national banners, such as 
the defeat  of the  pro market policies, the  recovery  of the  country´s  natural resources from 
transnational corporations, and the reversal of the reform program. 
 
Thus,  during  the  2000s,  the  pressure  of  the  social  movements  deeply  influenced  the 
policymaking  process.  Various  policy  measures  were  the  results  of  that  political  pressure, 
being the increase in hydrocarbons royalties from 18% to 50% of total output, the reversal of 
two license contracts to administer the water supply in the cities of La Paz and Cochabamba, 
the  postponement  of  the  project  to  export  natural  gas  to  the  U.S.  and  Mexico  using  LNG 
technology among the most noticeable. 
 
Eventually,  the  social  movements  and  other  left wing  political  groups  organized  around  a 
political  party,  the  Movimiento  al Socialismo (MAS) led  by  Evo  Morales,  and  were  able  to 
successfully compete in the 2005 general election, winning an absolute majority of the vote, 
which in turn granted the government a majority in Congress. Once in power, the government 
implemented a number of policies aimed at reversing the structural reforms of the 1990s, such 
as the re nationalization of various previously privatized companies, including Chaco, Andina 
and Transredes in the hydrocarbon sector; Entel in telecommunications, and the tin smelting 
company (Vinto). It is interesting to highlight that some of the measures taken by the new 
administration  relied  more  on  its  ability  to  gain  support  from  the  streets  rather  than  from 
Congress. 
 
The  counter reform  process  has  produced  some  positive  returns  to  the  government,  both 
economically  and  politically.  However,  these  policies  have  had  a  significant  cost  for  the 
Bolivian economy in terms of reduced investment flows which will eventually have a negative 
impact on the overall and sectoral productivity.  
 
The  government  wants  to  deepen  the  counter reform  process  and  to  continue  with  other 
policies, such as land redistribution and promote a larger role of the state in the economy. To 
this end, the administration has succeeded in approving a new constitution which will grant it 
with a constitutional framework to carry forward the counter reform process. Nevertheless, the Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




government has faced a strong opposition coming from two fronts. First, the opposition parties 
which control the Upper Chamber in Congress, and thus have the power to stop part of the 
government  initiatives.  The  government  has  resorted  to  social  movements  which,  through 
Congress sieges, have exerted pressure on the Senate and managed to impose the approval 
of some key laws on Congress. This strategy has been quite successful thus far. Second, the 
regions  in  the  lowlands,  which  have  traditionally  favored  market oriented  policies  and  the 
private initiative in economic activity, have fiercely opposed the government project to impose 
a socialist state dominated economy. These regions, namely Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and 
Tarija, are struggling with the Central Government for greater autonomy and, therefore, for the 
capacity to adopt a free market oriented economic model for their regions. 
 
In summary, from the analysis above, we can identify two patterns in the PMP over the last 25 
years: 
 
First, the Congress coalition system was the main support of the PMP between 1985 and 
1997,  guaranteeing  governance,  economic  stability  and  the  implementation  of  the  reform 
process. It became exhausted due to the increased dispersion of the electoral vote, which in 
turn made it more difficult to form coherent government coalitions. Paradoxically, in the 2005 
presidential  election,  the  voting  tended  to  concentrate  again,  as  only  four  political  parties 
obtained congressional representation. The government party (MAS) did not have to resort to 
any coalition as it controlled 53.5% of Congress on its own. Only one of the traditional political 
parties (MNR) still retains congressional representation. 
 
During  the  reform  process  (i.e.  between  1985  and  1997)  almost  all  political  parties  which 
obtained representation in Congress, in any of the national elections, participated in at least 
one of the coalitions which governed the country during that period. Thus, as can be observed 
in  Graph  3.2,  between  1993  and  2002,  almost  all  political  parties  with  congressional 
representation had participated in government coalitions which maintained or deepened the 
market oriented reform process. Since 1985, the reform process gained the support of political 
parties which had previously opposed it.  
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Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte Nacional Electoral 
(CNE) 
 
Secondly, starting in 2000, Congress lost its ability to represent the population and the PMP 
became increasingly  shaped  by  the pressure exerted  by  social movements  on the  streets. 
Parties  opposed  to  the  market oriented  model  which  had  not  participated  in  any  of  the 
previous coalitions, namely the MAS party of Evo Morales, began to receive the support of the 
population and obtained congressional representation. In the 2005 election, this tendency was 
accentuated. 
 
It is interesting to analyze why the market oriented reform, which seemed to be backed up by 
very  strong  congressional  coalitions  until  the  1997  election,  suddenly  lost  legitimacy  and 
support beginning with the 2002 election. A plausible explanation to this phenomenon is that 
the increasing dispersion of the vote was indeed reflecting that the loss of representation and Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




legitimacy of traditional parties had indeed begun much earlier. Parties such as MIR, Condepa 
and UCS obtained a relatively important vote in the electoral races, vowing that they were 
going  to  implement  policies  which  completely  differed  from  the  market oriented  model. 
Eventually, however, they ended up forming a coalition which allowed the reform process to 
continue. The MIR electoral campaign in 1989 for instance, was based on the slogan that 
there were going to “relocate SD 21060”. Later on, the MIR party formed a coalition with ADN, 
and continued the implementation of the free market model. 
 
The following graph shows the vote for non systemic parties, i.e. MIR, Condepa, UCS and 
NFR, before and after they participated in a government coalition. These parties campaigned 
with an anti systemic platform, but eventually ended up forming government coalitions led by 
systemic parties. Graph 3.3 unambiguously shows that these parties have lost support from 
their voters  over time,  which  could  be  evidence  that  these  parties  were  punished  by  their 
constituencies, because they had not fulfilled their expectations when they formed alliances 
with  ideologically opposed  parties.  The  exception  is  UCS  which  in  1997,  after  having 
participated in a government coalition between 1993 and 1997, increased their vote because 
of external factors, such as the death of its leader just before the 1997 election which had a 
deep emotional impact on the population. Otherwise, all other non systemic political parties 
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Electoral Voting for Non-systemic Parties before  
and after forming a coalition led by a Systemic Party 
 
Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte  
            Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
 
4.  Underlying factors affecting the PMP shifts 
 
4.1. Determinants of the PMP shifts  
The PMP in Bolivia has experienced dramatic changes over time, and essentially moved “from 
Congress to the streets”. We hypothesize that there were various factors which explain these 
changes: i) loss of legitimacy of the alliance system, ii) insufficient maturity time for the reforms 
to  deliver  results,  iii)  emphasis  of  the  reform  on  capital intensive  sectors,  and  iv)  regional 
differences  in  the  acceptance  of  the  reform  process,  due  to  existing  socio economic  gaps 
across  regions.  The  following  sub sections  briefly  define  these  factors  and  section  4.2 
presents some empirical evidence.  
 
4.1.1.  Loss of legitimacy of the alliance system 
The  alliance  system,  which  had  been  a  very  effective  mechanism  in  assuring  governance 
during the 1990s and a necessary condition to maintain democratic and economic stability, 
and thus deepen the reform process, became exhausted over time and lost representation in 
the  eyes  of  the  population.  The  high  degree  of  dispersion  in  the  electoral  vote  made  it Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




increasingly difficult to form a coherent coalition, since it became necessary to include a larger 
number of political parties into the coalition in order to attain Congressional control. 
 
4.1.2.  Insufficient maturity time for the reforms 
The reforms implemented during the 1990s, did not have a sufficiently long maturity period to 
deliver  positive  results  in  the  eyes  of  the  population.  For  instance,  the  capitalization  and 
sectoral  reforms  have  had  significant  success  in  promoting  investment  and  increasing  the 
access of the population to public services such as electricity, telecommunications, drinking 
water  and  sanitation.  The  reforms  also  brought  about  a  sizable  increase  in  hydrocarbon 
reserves and exports, increasing the exchange and fiscal revenues received by the country. 
The popular perception has been, however, unable to associate these positive results to the 
reform  process.  Quite  the  contrary,  the  reforms  were  blamed  for  the  negative  effects  the 
economic crisis of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s had on employment and income.     
 
4.1.3.  Emphasis of the reform process on capital-intensive sectors 
The  reforms  have  focused  on  capital intensive  sectors,  such  as  hydrocarbons,  electricity, 
telecommunications and financial services. As a result, these sectors exhibited large inflows of 
FDI, productivity gains and increased salaries for their workers. Labor intensive sectors, on the 
other  hand,  such  as  agriculture  and  urban  services,  where  the  bulk  of  the  labor  force  is 
employed, lagged behind. These gaps seem to have diminished the support for the reform 
process. 
 
4.1.4.  Different support to the reform process across regions 
There were deep regional socio economic gaps which have conditioned the support given by 
different regions to the reform process. For instance, regional indicators such as per capita 
GDP, poverty incidence, GDP growth, and regional Human Development Indicators (HDI) are 
closely  correlated  with  the  support,  or  lack  thereof,  for  the  reforms  across  regions.  The 
rationale is that regions with higher human development and lower poverty incidence were 
better prepared to take advantage of the productivity enhancing policies, and benefitted the 
most from income and productivity gains. Thus, these regions have tended to maintain their 
support for political parties which advocated for market oriented reforms. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





4.2. Econometric tests 
4.2.1.  Geographic concentration of the vote 
The objective of this section is to study the behavior of the vote, in order to judge the 
support the reform process was able to attract from the population. 
 
Graph 4.1 shows the support for political parties which promoted the reform process, or at 
least did not backtrack it, which we will call systemic. The share of votes obtained by these 
parties in elections is interpreted as a measure of the support to the reform process. A list 
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Systemic Anti-systemic
 
Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte  
             Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
The former figure shows the important support achieved by the systemic parties in 1985, 
which  can  be  explained  as  the reaction  of  the  electors to  the  economic  crisis  that the 
coalition of the 1983 government was not able to solve. The stabilization program fostered 
by the government in 1985, and the costs (social and political) associated with it, explain 
the fall in support for the systemic parties in the 1989 election. This is also explained by 
the classification of the MIR party as an anti systemic party for that year. This is justified Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




because  the  MIR  was  a  main  component  of  the  UDP  coalition  (1982 1985),  and  also 
because it campaigned promising to revert the NEP. The following elections (1993 and 
1997) witnessed an increase in the support for the systemic parties. 2002 shows a reversal 
in this trend, albeit moderate. The pattern of support changed dramatically in the 2005 
election,  where the voting for anti systemic parties  overcame  the support for traditional 
parties. 
 
It is important to note that anti systemic parties had an important support throughout the 
period studied. Even in 1985, and after the hyperinflation period, the anti systemic parties 
managed to obtain 24% of the vote. This figure probably underestimates the real support 
for anti systemic parties, since many other anti systemic parties (the most radical parties) 
frequently  opted  to  reject  the  electoral  institution,  and  called  for  abstention.  Graph  4.2 
shows the number of registered voters, issued and valid votes for the 1985 2002 elections. 
 
Graph 4.2 






















Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte  
            Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
A  hierarchical  agglomerative  average linkage  cluster  analysis  is  carried  out  in  order  to 
identify clusters of regions (departments) according to their support for systemic parties in 
each of the elections. This technique considers each observation as a separate group and Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




then combines the two closest groups. The process is repeated until the data is grouped 
into a relevant number of clusters. The method to compare the groups is called the linkage 
method.  The  average–linkage  method  uses  the  average  distance  between  the 
observations of the groups to select the two closest groups.  
In the Bolivian case, the data confirms the existence of two clusters: Cluster A groups the 
regions where the support for systemic parties is greater and cluster B where the support 
for these parties is weaker. Table 4.1 shows the years in which each region was part of 
one of the two clusters. 
 
Table 4.1 
Cluster A Cluster B





PANDO      
POTOSI
SANTA CRUZ      






















With the exception of 1997, the Duda Hart pseudo T squared test confirms that the data 
can be divided into two groups. The Duda Hart test finds the number of clusters based on 
the difference of the sums of the squared errors of the possible groups and the squared 
errors of the total data. In 1997 there could be 3 groups, with La Paz forming another 
group,  because  of  the  sharp  difference  with  all  other  departments  (much  more  anti 
systemic). It is clear that the cluster in the voting data reproduces the division that has Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




shaped the political dynamics in recent years. Cluster A represents the eastern provinces 
and  Cluster  B  the  western  provinces.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  how  this  clustering  has 
prevailed over time. There are only two exceptions to this rule: Cochabamba in 1989 and 
Chuquisaca  in  2002.  In  both  cases  these  departments  voted  closer  to  the  eastern 
provinces. Based on this analysis, regions are separated into two groups: “western” and 
“eastern” departments. 
 
Graph 4.3 shows the voting pattern in the five western departments: La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, 
Cochabamba and Chuquisaca. 
 
Graph 4.3 
Percentage of Votes for Systemic and Anti-systemic Political Parties 
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Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte Nacional 
            Electoral (CNE) 
 
 
For  comparison  purposes,  Graph  4.4  shows  the  voting  pattern  in  the  four  eastern 
departments: Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and Tarija. 
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Percentage of Votes for Systemic and Anti-systemic Political Parties 
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Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte Nacional  
             Electoral (CNE) 
 
In  all  of  the  elections,  the  support  of  the  eastern  departments  for  the  systemic 
parties(81.2%  on  average)  has  been  clearer  than  the  support  to  these  parties  in  the 
western departments (54.7% on average). The standard deviation of the vote for systemic 
parties in eastern regions (11.0) was systematically lower than that observed in western 
regions (13.9). There is, unambiguously, a difference in the voting pattern of the west and 
the east, as is determined by testing the difference of means for the support for systemic 
parties between eastern and western departments (see Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2 
Obs. Mean Std. Err.
Western 30 0,58 0,0287
Eastern 24 0,837 0,0209
Difference -0,257 0,0355
t-stat. -7,224
Test for difference of Means
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Moreover, the differences in the support for systemic parties between eastern and western 
departments have increased over time, as shown in Graph 4.5. 
 
Graph 4.5 
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Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte 
            Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
 
Location patterns and vote preferences  
In order to identify which location pattern determines the concentration of the support for 
systemic  parties,  a  spatial  test  is  performed  in  this  section.  Alternative  measures  of 
geographical location are constructed, forming a data panel  with fixed effects for election 
years. The spatial autoregressive models methodology is applied to data from six national 
elections  and  for  the  nine  departments  (54  observations).  The  estimated  model  is  as 
follows: 
 
Where y is the dependent variable (i.e. the support for systemic parties), X is a set of 
dummy variables for the elections years, and W is the spatial matrix, which reflects the 
spatial relationship between the different regions, and ε is an error term, which is normally 
distributed, with 
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The econometric test is performed for three alternative spatial matrixes. The first uses the 
rook contiguity  concept,  which defines the  presence of  contiguity of two  entities if they 
share a common side, in this case the vicinity of the regions. The second matrix forms two 
groups:  one for the  eastern and  another for the  western  departments. The third matrix 
takes  the  distances  between  the  main  cities  as  the  variable  which  measures  the 
geographic location, based on latitude longitude coordinates. 
 
The results of all regressions for the three spatial matrixes are presented in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3 
Spatial Regressions for the Support for the Systemic Parties 
Dependet Variable: Support for Systemic Parties
Variable Constant D1989 D1993 D1997 D2002 D2005 Contiguity σ^2 R-squ. Rbar-squ. Log-lik
Para. 0,6634 -0,1699 -0,0674 0,0862 0,02 -0,2283 0,0298 0,022 0,35 0,28 45,03
t-stat* 2,2773 -2,4269 -0,9625 1,2307 0,2862 -3,26 0,3362
Variable Constant D1989 D1993 D1997 D2002 D2005 Region σ^2 R-squared Rbar-squared Log-lik
0,167 -0,1699 -0,0674 0,0862 0,02 -0,2283 0,1409 0,008 0,35 0,28 72,08
2,7198 -4,1676 -1,6528 2,1134 0,4916 -5,5981 10,83
Variable Constant D1989 D1993 D1997 D2002 D2005 Distance σ^2 R-squared Rbar-squared Log-lik
3,6122 3,4422 3,5448 3,6984 3,6323 3,3839 -0,6549 0,013 0,33 0,26 77,33
13,3 12,67 13,05 13,62 13,37 12,46 -10,47
* Asyntotic  
 
In  the  case  of  the  contiguity  matrix,  the  coefficient  of  this  variable  is  not  significantly 
different from zero. This shows that although two regions can be neighbors, this does not 
mean that both would support, or not, a systemic party. 
 
The regression which groups the departments from the west and the east, separately, has 
a coefficient for the spatial matrix which is significantly different from zero, and has the 
expected  positive  sign.  This  regression  reflects  the  fact  that  the  departments  in  each 
region tend to behave in a similar way. 
 
Finally, the regression in which the spatial matrix reflects the distance between the main 
cities of each department, also has a significant coefficient. In this case, the sign of the Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




coefficient is negative, reflecting the fact that the larger the distance between the main 
cities of the departments, the more opposed their political views are. 
 
  Economic Growth and Regional Differences in Voting 
 
A plausible explanation of the difference in voter preferences, for or against the reform 
process, is the difference in economic growth among regions during the period covered in 
this research. The eastern  departments  enjoyed  a more rapid growth than  the  western 
ones  during  the  period  in  which  the  government  coalitions  ruled.  Economic  growth  in 
western departments was much slower, thus making their voters less willing to support the 
reform process. 
 
Table  4.5  shows  average  growth  rates  by  presidential  term  for  each  of  the  nine 
departments between 1989 (the year since data has become available) to 2003 (when the 
last president representing a coalition was forced to resign). 
 
Table 4.5 
1989 1992 1993 1996 1997 2001 2002 2003 1989 2003
Pando 3.25% 6.54% 8.18%  0.15% 5.32%
Beni 1.08% 3.23% 4.38%  0.07% 2.60%
Santa Cruz 5.11% 6.00% 4.88% 1.45% 4.78%
Tarija 4.95% 2.19% 7.44% 15.14% 6.40%
Potosí 4.46% 1.06% 1.81% 5.02% 2.74%
Oruro 5.35% 6.28% 3.95%  3.49% 3.96%
Cochabamba 2.34% 5.84% 2.72%  0.17% 3.06%
La Paz 4.14% 4.07%  0.28% 5.13% 2.78%
Chuquisaca 0.91%  0.26% 3.05%  0.30% 1.15%




It is interesting to note that the three best performers in GDP growth for the whole period 
are Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija, which are part of the eastern part of the country. Beni 
was the only department in the east which exhibited a lower growth rate. The western 
departments comprise the less dynamic growth group. In what follows, we test statistically 
the hypothesis which attributes the difference in voting to differences in growth rates. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





Using  cluster  analysis,  regions  are  classified  into  more  dynamic  and  less  dynamic 
departments based on their economic growth rates, between 1989 and 2003 (Table 4.6). 
 
Table 4.6 
More Dynamic Less Dynamic
La Paz, Potosí, Cochabamba, 




For the 1989 2003 period, the Eastern regions (with the exception of Beni) were the most 
dynamic with an average growth rate of 5.1%. The western regions (with the exception of 
Oruro), were, in contrast, the less dynamic regions with an average growth rate of 2.4%. 
Therefore,  with  the  exception  of  Beni  and  Oruro,  the  eastern  regions  have  grown 
significantly faster than the western regions during the reform period. 
 
In  order  to  test  whether  the  classification  above  still  holds  when  shorter  periods  are 
considered, average  growth  rates are  taken for the  periods  of  government immediately 
before the elections (1989 1992, 1993 1996, 1997 2001), the years of the last government 
of Sanchez de Lozada (2002 2003), and the most recent period (2004 2007) (Table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.7 
Average rate of Growth by Department 
Pando Beni Santa Cruz Tarija Potosí Oruro Cochabamba La Paz Chuquisaca
1989-1992 3,25% 1,08% 5,11% 4,95% 4,46% 5,35% 2,34% 4,14% 0,91%
1993-1996 6,54% 3,23% 6,00% 2,19% 1,06% 6,28% 5,84% 4,07% -0,26%
1997-2001 8,18% 4,38% 4,88% 7,44% 1,81% 3,95% 2,72% -0,28% 3,05%
2002-2003 -0,15% -0,07% 1,45% 15,14% 5,02% -3,49% -0,17% 5,13% -0,30%
2004-2007 6,38% 3,53% 3,68% 14,85% 5,62% 1,96% 3,79% 3,15% 3,18%  
 
With this data the cluster analysis for each period yields the results presented in Table 4.8. 
In addition, the average rate of growth for each cluster is shown in Table 4.9. 
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Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, 
Chuquisaca, 
Cochabamba
Beni, Oruro, Santa Cruz Chuquisaca, La Paz, 
Cochabamba
Beni, Oruro, 
Cochabamba, La Paz, 
Santa Cruz, Pando
Beni, Pando, Chuquisaca, 
Cochabamba
Outlyers











More Dinamic Less Dynamic Negative Positive
1989-1992 4,80% 1,90%
1993-1996 5,33% 1,00%
1997-2001 4,41% 2,53% -0,28% 7,81%
2002-2003 4,29% 1,35% -3,95% 16,42%





The results obtained when the cluster analysis is carried out for shorter periods, is not as 
conclusive as the results obtained at the aggregated level. It is interesting to note that 
between 1989 and 2001, Santa Cruz was part, in every period, of the more dynamic group. 
The same also applies to Oruro, with the exception of the 2002 2003 period. La Paz has 
been in the dynamic group in the first two periods but has moved to the less dynamic 
group in the third and fifth periods. Chuquisaca has been in the less dynamic group during Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




the  whole  period.  Finally,  Beni,  Pando,  Tarija,  Cochabamba  and  Potosí  have  moved 
alternatively from one group to the other. 
 
The  period  from  1997  to  2001,  however,  shows  a  clearer  division.  The  eastern 
departments show a better performance than the western departments (excluding Oruro). 
It is also important to note that the differences in the rate of growth between the groups 













The crisis of the late nineties seems to have had a much more profound impact in the 
western departments. The eastern departments, in contrast maintained their rate of growth 
relatively stable. Moreover, Tarija and Pando increased their growth achieving very high 
rates of growth. In the period 1997 2001, economic growth followed divergent trends in the 
eastern and western departments, with the exception of Oruro. 
 
Regions which showed more support for the systemic parties were also regions which had 
higher growth rates. Graph 4.6 shows the support for systemic parties and the average 
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Systemic Support and Average Growth 
 
Source: Own estimates based on data published by the Corte Nacional 
            Electoral (CNE) and National Accounts published by INE 
 
Although the relationship between vote and growth seems to be conclusive for the whole 
1989 2003 period, there are two major shortcomings in this evidence: i) many explanatory 
variables which could explain the support tend to co vary, making it difficult to distinguish 
the effects of each of them on the variability of voter preferences, and ii) there could be a 
problem  of  aggregation  of individual  data,  which  can bias  the  results  of  the  regression 
leading to spurious correlations. In order to overcome these problems we use data at the 
micro level obtained from the Lapop surveys. 
The  Lapop  surveys  are  a  series  of  surveys  conducted  in  Latin  American  countries 
systematically, every odd year. The survey asks about the vote of the interviewed, so the 
determinants of the support for different parties can be explored in further detail. Data for 
the  1998,  2002,  and  2006  surveys  are  used,  since  those  are  the  ones  closest  to  an 
election year. As before, political parties are classified in two groups: systemic and anti 
systemic. It should be noted that some respondents prefer not to reveal their vote, and if 
the non response is not evenly distributed among the political parties, this could introduce 
some bias into the results. It is assumed that this is not the case. 
As mentioned above, the possible explanations for the regional differences co vary at the 
aggregate level. But at the individual level this is not necessarily the case, thus, individual 
level  data  can  help  to  discriminate  the  influence  of  the  different  variables,  especially Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




income, on the voting pattern. Table 4.11 shows the result of regressing a logit function for 
the vote pattern (1 systemic, 0 anti systemic) as the dependent variable, and the following 
as explanatory variables: region (dichotomous with 1 identifying the lowlands, and 0 the 
highlands),  urban  (1  urban,  0  rural),  Language  (1  Spanish,  0  native  language  or 
combination of Spanish and native), Race (1 Hispanic, 2 mestizo, 3 native), age, years of 
education, and income (an ordinal variable with 5 tranches).  
 
Table 4.11 
Region Urban Language Race Age Education Income F Pr(vote) Pred.
1998 0,1256 -0,0431 - -0,0585 0,0015 0,0037 - 11,4200 0,9166
(0,0143) (0,0174) - (0,0150) (0,0005) (0,0018) - - -
2002 0,1289 -0,0431 0,1439 -0,0646 0,0026 - 0,0274 21,8500 0,8461
(0,0229) (0,0201) (0,0287) (0,0201) (0,0006) - (0,0076) - -
2006 0,3653 - 0,2496 -0,1021 - - 0,0345 47,7400 0,3822






Region is a significant variable in explaining the probability of voting for a systemic party, 
which  increases  if  those  interviewed  live  in  the  lowlands.  The  effect  of  this  variable  is 
strong in the three periods and it presents a three fold increase in the 2006 election. The 
urban/rural variable is significant for 1998 and 2002, but loses significance for the 2006 
election. The effect of this variable is one third of that corresponding to the region variable. 
Language was not significant in the 1998 election, but turned out to be significant in the 
following elections, and became very significant in the 2006 election. Race was significant 
for the three elections, and became increasingly important over time. Age was significant 
for the 1998 and 2002 elections, but lost significance in 2006. Its influence in the vote is 
recognizable, but relatively small. Education was significant only for 1998. Income lacked 
significance for the 1998 elections, but became significant for 2002 and 2006. Its size is 
relatively small, but increasing. 
The  logit  regressions  seem  to  show  that  the  region  effect  is  very  important,  and  its 
importance  does  not  depend  on  the  effect  of  income,  race,  language,  urbanization  or 
education. Income has become increasingly important over time in determining the vote 
preferences, and this could explain, in part, the differences in vote between departments, Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




but this effect is relatively small, and region still remains as the most influential factor in 
determining vote preferences. It is also important to note that race and language have 
become  more  and  more  significant  as  determinants  of  voter  preferences,  showing  a 
growing division among these variables. 
 
5.  The magic of politics 
5.1. The unsustainability of the current PMP 
From the discussion above, it is evident that the PMP in Bolivia has experienced dramatic 
shifts over time. Traditional political parties have lost legitimacy and representation, and social 
movements have become paramount players in the PMP. Regional organizations and regional 
governments  have  also  acquired  a  significant  leverage  in  the  PMP.  Congress  has  also 
experienced a significant loss of legitimacy as a key arena in the PMP. The streets, on the 
other  hand,  seem  to  have  an  upper hand  in  influencing  the  PMP.  Policy  objectives  have 
become essentially political and productivity goals have been largely neglected. Finally, the 
representative democracy system has lost ground to a more participative and direct type of 
democracy, where currencies such as the “cabildo”, the referendum and the assembly are 
dominant in the PMP. 
 
However, there are strong reasons to believe that the currently existing PMP in Bolivia is not 
sustainable in the long run. There are political and economic factors that will make the current 
PMP unsustainable over time.  
 
First, the disregard for economic and productivity objectives in the current PMP will result in a 
reduced growth and employment capacity of the economy in the long run, which will eventually 
reduce the support of the population for the counter reform process. The political volatility and 
the nationalization policies carried out by the government have resulted in a considerable drop 
in the investment rates. Bolivia has already lost the privileged position it had as a major player 
in  the  hydrocarbons  business  in  South  America.  The  hydrocarbons  sector  is  already 
experiencing the effects of reduced investment flows and decreased reserves, and the country 
is not complying with its export commitments.  The institutional volatility has also caused the 
cancellation of important energy projects, like the LNG export project to Mexico and the U.S. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




Other sectors which have experienced fast growth and technological upgrades in the past, as 
a  result  of  the  FDI  flows  attracted  by  the  reforms,  are  already  experiencing  bottlenecks 
because of the reduced investment rates. Furthermore, free trade agreements with the United 
States and the European Union have been relegated by the government on the grounds of 
ideological arguments. This is expected to contribute to a slower pace in economic growth and 
to a sluggish employment creation in the long run. 
 
Second, the economic bonanza enjoyed by the current administration, will eventually end, and 
is likely to produce a profound economic crisis. Thus far, a key factor that has favored the 
populist  policies  implemented  by  the  Evo  Morales  administration,  in  order  to  secure  the 
support of the population for its counter reform strategy, has been the extremely favorable 
conditions existing in the world economy between 2005 and 2008. The world boom in metal 
prices  has  given  new  breath  to  the  mining  sector  in  Bolivia,  generating  employment  and 
income opportunities to workers in the western highlands, where poverty is deeply entrenched. 
High  oil  prices  on  the  other  hand,  have  raised  export  prices  of  natural  gas,  considerably 
increasing  fiscal  revenues.  Thus,  the  government  has  had  sufficient  fiscal  revenues  to 
increase spending and create various bonuses which favor different groups of the population. 
Paradoxically, the main supply of resources for the Evo Morales government, used to finance 
its populist policies, are the export revenues of the large natural gas reserves discovered in 
the  1990s,  as  a  result  of  the  market oriented  structural  reforms  implemented  during  that 
period. Therefore, the international economic recession that is expected to affect the world 
economy in the coming years, can put Evo Morales’ plans in great jeopardy. 
 
Third,  the  government  has  evidenced  serious  shortages  of  qualified  high ranking  officials 
which have contributed to the poor quality of policies. The ambitious economic plan set forth 
by the government in 2006, known as the National Development Plan, has experienced delays 
and deficiencies, not only because of the inherent weaknesses of the plan itself, but also due 
to the lack of management capacity to implement it. The lack of an efficient economic policy 
management  can  represent  a  serious  problem  in  the  current  situation,  where  the  reduced 
availability  of fiscal  resources,  due  to  the  international  economic  crisis,  can  cause  serious 
macroeconomic disequilibria.  Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





5.2. The Future of the PMP in Bolivia 
Bolivians are in search of means to build a more equitable society by eradicating poverty and 
exclusion.  To  achieve  that,  it  is  crucial  to  rebuild  a  common  sense  of  purpose  above  all 
cleavages. This is a process of consensus building that will take a long time. Some of the 
reforms introduced after 1985 should prevail, and the same should happen with some of the 
reforms introduced after 2005. In this process,  additional swings in the policy mix orientation 
cannot be ruled out until a stable and livable equilibrium is attained within the society.  
 
Policies to improve productivity can be seen as a particular outcome of a new policy making 
process  in  Bolivia,  but  also  a  contributing  factor  to  reach  the  goals  which  the  country  is 
agreeing upon. It is with this latter perspective that some recommendations emerge from the 
discussion that this paper has set forth. 
 
5.2.1.  Rescuing the political party system. 
The Bolivian society has a tendency to act more in a corporatist way rather than a democratic 
one. However, there is a general discomfort with this form of social representation. During the 
debates of the Constitutional Assembly which took place in 2006 and 2007, no proposal with a 
corporatist orientation was ever accepted. Hence, the political party system has been given a 
chance to regain the confidence of the general public.  
 
The loss of confidence in the political party system is at the root of the de institutionalization of 
the country´s PMP. The reconstruction of that confidence is a matter which should be in the 
hands of both the State and the political parties themselves. The responsibility of the State 
should be to enact and enforce a modern regulation for political parties. Free and democratic 
election of party leaders at the national, regional and local levels, should be supervised by the 
National Electoral Court. Good party registries, and transparency and accountability of their 
administrators  should  contribute  to  attract  supporters  to  these  organizations. Political party 
charters describing the ideals and principles they support, and which spell out their rules of 
governance clearly, should be of public domain. Additionally, the allocation of public funds Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




could  be  considered  to  contribute  to  capacity  building  at  all  levels  of  the  political 
establishment, and of course, for society at large. 
 
5.2.2.  Autonomies and decentralization 
Four out of nine departments have voted in referenda to demand autonomous governments for 
their departments (regions). Even in those departments which voted against the autonomy, the 
idea of becoming autonomous is gaining a strong support. All municipalities covering the full 
extension  of  the  Bolivian  territory  are  already  autonomous  governments  at  the  local  level. 
Therefore, more competences from the central government, with the appropriate amount of 
funding, could be transferred to those instances, while, at the same time, strengthening the 
mechanisms envisaged in the Popular Participation Law. This is a way to bridge the gap which 
has traditionally separated the State from its citizens.   
 
Some progress has been achieved in the discussions that led to a draft proposal for a new 
constitution.  Some  progress is  still  needed  in  order  to  assign  competences  to  the  regions  
which  could  be  better  managed  at  the  regional  level  and  some  power  and  independence 
should be granted for the funding of the implementation of local and regional programs and 
projects. 
 
5.2.3.  Direct Democracy Participation 
As described in earlier parts of this document, Bolivia has already adopted the referenda as a 
means to consult the  population  on  a  very  broad range of  public  policy issues. Amazingly 
enough, in four years after its inception in the Bolivian law, this mechanism has been utilized 
in six occasions at the national level and in four occasions at the regional level. But this does 
not imply that Bolivians today are better interpreted by their authorities. All these referenda 
have had, to different degrees, some sort of formal and factual objections that in most cases 
were,  to  some  extent,  very  well  argumented.  Since  Bolivia´s  Constitutional  Tribunal  was 
beheaded some time ago, there is no legal instance which could resolve all these cases. 
 
Once these institutions of a direct democracy have been adopted, it is crucial to protect them 
and to promote them as a way to grant an alternative and powerful way to let the population’s  Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




preferences be made clear and explicit. It is also important to regulate these institutions in 
order to  avoid  their  manipulation  with  the intention  to  block  executive  initiatives,  endanger 
governability,  or  pursue  special  interests.  It  is  well known  that  because  of  the  “rational 
ignorance” of voters, the electorate can become the victim of predation. The indiscriminate use 
of referenda could exacerbate this problem. The regulation should establish the issues which 
could be the subject of a referendum, and establish the frequency of use of this institution in 
order to avoid its indiscriminate use.  The information that the voters should receive prior to 
the  ballot  should  also  be  regulated  and  promoted.  Additionally,  it  is  crucial  to  develop  a 
trustworthy  electoral  system,  preserving  its  independence  from  the  ruling  parties,  and 
protecting the electoral registries from any sort of manipulation. 
 
5.2.4.  Balanced Regional Development Policies  
An  equitable  development  and  the  eradication  of  poverty  are  goals  which  require  specific 
policies to develop the western part of Bolivia. It is there where poverty is concentrated, and at 
the same time, it is the most populated single area of the country and it is the place where the 
seat of government is located; therefore it constitutes the epicenter of social conflicts. 
 
It is only through market access, and labor intensive investments (both private and public) that 
this  region  will  develop.  These  conditions  are  easy  to  be  spelled  out  but  very  difficult  to 
achieve. Apart from the strong ideological postures, which favor an unattainable welfare State, 
there is the need to gain consensus to assign resources to the poorest regions of the country 
in a proportion over the most affluent ones. The distribution of these resources has been the 
subject matter of the most recent regional and social unrest in the country. A precondition to 
implement effective development policies in this part of the country is to open a dispassionate 
debate on these matters. 
 
5.2.5.  Social Cohesion. 
Social cohesion lies above all the challenges Bolivia faces in the coming future. In the recent 
past, the struggle for power has deepened most of the cleavages which separate the Bolivian 
society.  Even  after  the  constitutional  provision  allowing  the  formation  of  autonomous 
governments in all nine departments, regional tensions remain strong between the eastern Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




and the western parts of the country. The disputes are still centered on the vision each region 
has for the future of the country. At the same time, Bolivia´s cultural diversity, which called for 
the formation of a multicultural nation, is now putting the country in the need to harmonize 36 
different nationalities into one State. All these nationalities are indigenous populations with 
strong ties to the countryside. However, there is no formal recognition of the large mestizo 
population which resides in the urban areas. As a result, urban and rural interests are now in 
conflict.  Currently,  there  is  a  struggle  about  their  representation  in  the  new  Pluri national 
Legislative Assembly which will replace Parliament after the national election of 2009. 
The future of the PMP in Bolivia rests in the country´s ability to design a new institutional order 
capable  of  coping  with  all  the  regional,  social  and  political  confrontations  that  have  been 
exacerbated over the last few years. It is not a matter of inclusion any more, but rather, a 
quest to  unify  the  country´s diversity  along  a common  vision  of  a shared future  within the 
boundaries of a vast territory. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The  PMP  in  Bolivia  has  experienced  substantial  shifts  over  the  years.  Traditional  political 
parties  have  lost  legitimacy  and  representation,  and  social  movements  have  become 
paramount players in the PMP. Regional organizations and regional governments have also 
acquired a significant leverage in the PMP. Congress has also experienced a significant loss 
of legitimacy as a key arena in the PMP. The streets, on the other hand, seem to have an 
upper hand in influencing the PMP. Policy objectives have become essentially short sighted 
and  productivity  goals  have  been  largely  neglected.  Finally,  the  representative  democracy 
system has lost ground to a “participative and direct type of democracy”, where results of a 
“cabildo”, a referendum or an assembly are dominant within the PMP. 
 
There are various factors which contribute to explain these changes: i) loss of legitimacy of the 
political  coalition  system,  ii)  insufficient  maturity  time  for  the  reforms  to  deliver  results,  iii) 
emphasis  of  the  reform  on  capital intensive  sectors,  and  iv)  regional  differences  in  the 
acceptance of the reform process, due to existing socio economic gaps across regions. 
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The coalition system which had been a very effective mechanism to ensure governance during 
the 1990s, and a necessary condition to maintain democratic and economic stability and, thus, 
deepen the reform process, became exhausted over time and lost representation in the eyes 
of the population. The high degree of dispersion in the electoral voting made it increasingly 
difficult to form a coherent coalition, since it became necessary to include a larger number of 
political parties into the coalition, in order to attain Congressional control. 
 
The  structural reforms carried  out during the 1980s  and 1990s have  produced remarkable 
results in terms of productivity increases in sectors where reforms were implemented, such as 
hydrocarbons,  electricity,  and  telecommunications.  The  reforms  brought  about  significant 
inflows of FDI to these sectors, which in turn increased the production of services, boosting the 
access of the population to these services. In addition, the reform process also focused on 
distributive policies through reforms such as the Popular Participation, which transferred fiscal 
resources  and  competences  to  municipalities  and  departments.  Support  for  the  reform 
process,  however,  has  tended  to  decline,  especially  in  the  regions  located  in  the  western 
highlands,  comprising  the  departments  of  La  Paz,  Chuquisaca,  Cochabamba,  Oruro  and 
Potosí.   
 
Historically,  these  regions  have  favored  a  much  deeper  involvement  of  the  State  in  the 
economic  activity,  and  have,  therefore,  traditionally  supported  political  options  which 
advocated  for  a  state led  economic  model.  The  opposite  occurs  in  the  eastern  lowlands, 
where  the  support  for  a  market oriented  model  is  more  deeply  entrenched.  Thus,  these 
regions  have  tended  to  support  parties  which  favor  market oriented  policies.  Regional 
differences in other socio economic factors seem to have also determined the varied support 
for the reforms across regions, such as per capita GDP, education, race, language and GDP 
growth.   
 
There are other factors which have had profound effects on the population support for the 
reform  process  and  on  the  changing  nature  of  the  PMP.  The  reforms  focused  on  capital 
intensive sectors, bringing about large inflows of FDI, productivity gains and increased salaries 
for workers in these sectors. Labor intensive sectors, on the other hand, where the bulk of the Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




labor force is employed, exhibited much lower productivity increases and, consequently, real 
income lagged behind. The productivity and income gaps have taken away support for the 
reform process. 
 
Finally, the reforms implemented during the 1990s, did not have a sufficiently long maturity 
period to deliver positive results in the eyes of the population, amid the economic crisis of the 
late 1990s which deeply affected economic activity and employment, reducing the support of 
the population for the political parties who participated in implementing the reforms. 
 
The current PMP in Bolivia, however, is not sustainable in the long run. There are political and 
economic  factors  which  will  make  the  current  PMP  unviable  over  time.  For  instance,  the 
disregard for economic and productivity objectives, which characterize the current PMP will 
eventually result in a reduced growth and employment capacity of the economy in the long 
run, which will eventually reduce the support of the population for the counter reform process. 
 
Bolivia  has  the  urgent  need  to  attain  a  new  PMP  that  is  more  inclusive,  places  greater 
emphasis on productivity and employment creation and will, therefore, be more sustainable in 
the long run. Policies to foster productivity should focus on sectors that were neglected in the 
reform process. Bolivia has the challenge to construct a more sustainable PMP, based on a 
more  equitable  society  by  eradicating  poverty.  A  sustainable  PMP  must  promote  policies 
aimed at enhancing productivity, but also at attaining goals which society, as a whole, has 
agreed upon. 
 
This will not be an easy task. At the root of all challenges for the PMP lies the most pressing 
need to restore cohesion in society. In the recent past, the struggle for power has deepened 
most of the divisions which separate the Bolivian society. Therefore, Bolivia has to build a new 
institutional  order  capable  of  unifying  the  country´s  diversity  along  a  common  vision  of  a 
shared  future  and,  hence,  one  capable  of  restoring  some  order  to  the  selection  of  public 
policies which best serve the interests of the Bolivian population at large. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 
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Actors, Interests, Arenas, and Currencies 
The 2006 IDB report on the economic and social progress in Latin America, The Politics of 
Policies, provided an in depth analysis of the process by which public policy decisions are 
made and implemented in the region. A number of country studies accompanied that report, 
but  Bolivia  was  not  a  case  under  scrutiny.  Hence,  this  Annex  is  intended  to  fill  that  gap 
describing actors, arenas, interests and currencies that are part of the policymaking process in 
the  country.  Obviously,  an  emphasis  is  placed  on  those  actors  which  constitute  the  main 
building  blocks  of  the  research  presented  in  this  paper.  Here,  the  reader  will  find  some 
additional background information on the driving interests of relevant actors for the PMP, the 
arenas where they interacted, and the mechanisms and currencies used during the reform 
process and its ulterior reversal. 
 
A.1.  Institutional development and the PMP process: an overview 
To better understand the roles played by different actors in the policy arenas and domains 
which  brought  the  decision making  process  “from  Congress  to  the  streets”,  as  is  being 
portrayed in this paper, it is useful to bear in mind that Bolivia, aside from being poor, is a 
highly fragmented  society  with  a  low  institutional  development.  These  characteristics  have 
interacted, and still do so, to prevent any deep rooting of State policies which could foster 
development if applied consistently over time.  
The most prominent lines of social cleavages in Bolivia are regional, territorial, class, ethnic, 
and ideological. Hence, efficient and equitable policy design is cumbersome. In addition, the 
introduction of ways to open up social participation in the decision making process has been 
very slow, especially for the recognition of a rising social demand for tending to the pressing 
conditions emerging from severe economic crises and external shocks.  
The National Revolution of 1952 which introduced an agrarian reform, the abolition of peasant 
labor exploitation, and granted voting rights to women and the rural population, proposed the 
construction  of  a  nation state  based  on  a  broad  alliance  of  classes.  This  ideal  was  not Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




achieved.  Instead,  both  under  democratic  and military regimes,  exclusion  was the norm to 
form ruling coalitions which, not on seldom occasions, were corrupt. Public policy design and 
implementation  was  increasingly  centralized,  exposing  the  decision making  process  to 
pressure and lobbying. 
In the period covered by this paper, Bolivians had to adapt to new conditions after a profound 
economic and institutional reform process, with an obvious new balance of winners and losers. 
That process was subject to misperceptions about who was getting the largest benefits or 
enduring the pains coming from the reforms, which exacerbated social tensions and, ironically, 
ended up unifying a large part of the population against the reforms. 
The reform process initiated in 1985 was first devised to cope with hyperinflation and then, to 
remove structural obstacles for economic and social development. Institutional reforms geared 
to deal with social and political imbalances were introduced in a second generation reform 
which began only in 1993.  
Military regimes governed the country for almost two decades before the return of democracy 
in 1982. During the time under military rule, relations between the State and the civil society 
were corporatist in nature. Only one major political party exists since the 1940´s; all others 
were born as part of the struggle for the return to democracy and thereafter. Therefore, the 
issue of formal and democratic participation and representation is still an evolving matter and 
is subject to constant debate in Bolivia.  
In general terms, it is difficult to link the influence of social actors to their economic weight in 
society.  The  sectoral  composition  of  GDP  and  employment  does  not  provide  clues  for 
explaining gravitating forces in the PMP. For most of the time covered in this paper, agriculture 
has been the leading sector in the economy, accounting for almost 20% of GDP, and 40% of 
employment. However, neither the rural population nor the business community involved in 
this sector was an influential player in the PMP. That is not the case if we concentrate our 
attention in the composition of exports. Mining exports were at the top of Bolivian exports until 
the collapse of  tin prices in 1985.  Until then, both miner labor and  business  organizations 
gained  some  predominance  in  the  political  and  social  life  of  Bolivia.  However,  after  the 
collapse  of  mineral  prices  worldwide  and  the  close  of  state   and  privately run  mining 
operations, this sector had almost disappeared from the scene. Natural gas, soybeans, and Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




agroindustry have overtaken the former preeminence of mining in the economy, but people in 
these sectors have not attained decisive influence in the PMP. 
Results from the 2004 referendum and the 2005 elections, have clearly shown that, a majority 
of  Bolivians  have  put  an  end  to  20  years  of  liberal  and  market oriented  policies  with  a 
productivity enhancing orientation. No clear alternative has emerged to replace public policies 
from the ancient regime. The Bolivian government is currently attempting to implement policies 
with a mix of indigenism, socialism and nationalism. This process has polarized the country in 
terms of ethnic sentiments, political preferences and regional interests, conferring the Bolivian 
case a unique situation of conflict and opportunity with deep implications for the PMP. 
 
A.2.  Institutionalized Actors 
a)  The political party system 
The Bolivian political party system is in the midst of a profound crisis, making governance in 
Bolivia  increasingly  difficult.  It  is  widely  admitted  that  politicians  lost  contact  with  their 
constituencies  a  long  time  ago.  In  order  to  attain  power,  political  parties  have  relegated 
programmatic guidelines in favor of short lived pragmatic ruling coalitions. This has contributed 
to discredit the political party system, and has eroded its representation capabilities.  
In view of this circumstance, some of the second generation reforms were intended to open up 
the space for greater social participation. In 1994, the Popular Participation Law (PPL) divided 
the nation´s territory into 311 autonomous municipalities, and provided for direct election of 
councilmen  and  mayors.  It  also  devised  grass root  consultative  and  supervisory  bodies 
(Consejos  de  Vigilancia)  to  interact  with  the  elected  officials  in  setting  priorities  for  the 
allocation  of  resources.  Some  competences  in  education,  health  and  infrastructure  were 
transferred from the central government to the municipalities. Funding for these autonomous 
entities  came,  and  still  does  so,  from  a  revenue sharing  mechanism  and  from  local  taxes 
directly  collected  by  the  municipal  treasuries.  The  idea  with  the  PPL  was  to  make  the 
municipal  territory  an  area  of  direct  democratic  participation.  Links  with  the  national 
government  were  defined  through  regional  administrations  (prefecturas)  in  the 
Decentralization Law which, in turn, had transferred resources and competences, until then, 
under the central government domain. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




Also  in  1994,  the  Constitution  was  amended  to  introduce  a  German  style  mixed member 
proportional  electoral  system.  Local  constituencies  now  directly  elect  half  of  the  Lower 
Chamber. Political  party  affiliation  was  removed  from  the requirements  to  be  elected  as a 
Deputy or as a member of a municipal council. Political participation was opened up to other 
organizations  different  from  political  parties.  These  were  called  citizen  organizations 
(Agrupaciones Ciudadanas) in an additional attempt to cope with the erosion in the role of 
political parties as intermediary bodies for the Bolivian society. To grasp the significance of 
this decision, it could be mentioned that the very same year in which political participation was 
opened up, 400 Agrupaciones Ciudadanas were legally organized, to take part in municipal 
elections held that year.  
All these reforms were not enough to institutionalize social participation in the decision making 
process, nor to restore confidence in the political party system. The political landscape was 
even  more  fragmented  after  these  reforms.  Not  only  was  the  number  of  political  parties 
participating in national or municipal elections increased from 8 to 14 between 1979 and 1993 
(see Table C.1), but also, the number of Agrupaciones Ciudadanas almost doubled its number 
between  1994  and  2002. The  reform  intended  to  give  the  population  an  alternative  to the 
political system representation was underestimated by the traditional political parties. With the 
exception of the momentum gained after 2002 by the Movimiento al Socialismo, a political 
agglomeration which does not conform to most of the characteristics of a political party in a 
strict sense, there is no evidence of any major change in the way the political party system 
was structured or run which would have brought them closer to their constituencies. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 























Demands for greater participation and inclusion mounted after the implementation of the PPL, 
decentralization law, and the constitutional amendment. In 2004, after dramatic circumstances 
of  social  unrest,  in  relation  to  hydrocarbon  policies,  and  the  resignation  of  the  incumbent 
President, Congress passed a law allowing for referenda on public policies at the national, 
regional  and  local  levels.  This  institution  of  a  tool  for  direct  democracy  was  first  and 
immediately  adopted to  decide  on  the nationalization  of  the hydrocarbons  sector. Later, in 
2006, this form of direct participation in the decision making process was introduced to the 
Constitution with an amendment which enjoyed an ample political consent but not full legal 
conformity.  
The lack of effective intermediary bodies in the political system has de institutionalized the 
PMP and has contributed to the multiplication of representing entities with a disperse agenda 
of local and sectoral interests. The ideas at play were concentrated in the extremes of the 
political  spectrum, as  was reflected in the  2005  election results. That  year,  the  number of 
political parties decreased to 1979 levels but the Movimiento al Socialismo, which proposed to 
terminate  capitalism  in  the  country,  and  to  reverse  the  reforms  implemented  since  1985, 
concentrated 53.7% of the electorate vote, making Evo Morales President without the need to 
conform a ruling coalition with another party. 
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The  crisis  in  the  political  party  system  responds  to  causes  which  could be  traced  back  in 
history, which are deeply rooted in structural traits of the Bolivian society, but also to the lack 
of response to events that were signaling a divorce of the political parties from the interests of 
the general public. If we look back to the election held in 1951
4, we can find a similar regional 
split of the vote as the one shown election after election in the period covered by this paper. 
Back in 1951, the electorate was comprised only of urban and educated men. Women and 
illiterate people (almost the entirety of the rural population, at that time, the vast majority of the 
population) were not allowed to vote. Notwithstanding, this characteristic of the electorate, the 
vote in the east favored the MNR, a party which was championing the end of the quasi feudal 
regime, while the east was mostly inclined in favor of the status quo. This geographical vote 
pattern has remained over the period covered in this paper. There are immediate reasons 
which could explain this behavior, some of them related with the reform process. There are 
also other cultural and structural explanations which have contributed to this result. It could 
then be questioned why it is that the political parties have not responded adequately to this 
trend. One possible explanation has to do with a natural tendency of all political parties to lean 
to the center and away from the left
5, at least in the eyes of the electorate. This is so because 
there is always room for a new political party which will proclaim more radical ideas in defense 
of the interest of the largest segments of a society. At the same time, political parties, already 
in the arena, are occupied attempting to gain support from other segments of society with 
some real circumstantial power. In the case of Bolivia, the MNR which back in 1952 carried out  
the agrarian reform, nationalized the mining sector; instituted voting rights for women and the 
rural  population;  opened  up  the  economy  in  1985,  and  introduced  all  the  market oriented 
reforms  which  are  analyzed  in  this  paper.  The  MNR  is  the  only  political  party  which  has 
outlived the last six decades. Annex C presents a list of more than 40 political parties that 
have participated alone, or in some form of alliance, in the elections held in the period covered 
                                      
4 This section is broadly based on the third edition of the book written by Salvador Romero Ballivián, Geografía 
Electoral de Bolivia. This is probably the single and most dominant book on the sociology of the electoral process in 
Bolivia from 1979 until 2002, but at the same time an interesting history of the major political parties which 
participated in those elections. 
5 Here we adhere to the notion that right and left are relative categories in the political spectrum, beyond 
ideological confinements. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




by  this  paper. Most  of these  parties  do  not exist  today.  The  bulk of them,  if not  all, have 
emerged to political life as left leaning entities, or at least as true defenders of the interest of 
the poor, the indigenous population and the impoverished middle classes. Only the MAS has 
been able to participate in the last three elections gaining an increasing number of votes and 
increasingly  radical  proposals  against  the  traditional  political  system  and  market oriented 
reforms. 
 
b)  State institutions 
The reform and counter reform process (1985 2008) examined in this paper has taken place 
under a Constitution which has been replaced by a new one. The new Constitution was drafted 
in  a  Constitutional  Assembly  (2006 2008)  dominated  by  the  MAS,  later  on  modified  by 
Congress (2008) with a MAS majority, and approved by the population in a referendum held in 
January 2009. The  results  of this  referendum have a  similar regional split as in any  other 
election. The western part of Bolivia approved the new Constitution; the eastern and southern 
parts rejected it.  
However, it is still relevant to portray, although briefly, the nature of the rules and regulations 
which governed the life of the State in the period covered in this paper. The transit of the PMP 
“from Congress to the Streets”, deserves at least a sketchy background information on the 
former Constitution. At the end of this section we single out the main implications of the new 
Constitution for the PMP.  
Bolivian  State  institutions  were  organized  in  three  independent  branches:  Legislative, 
Executive, and the Judiciary. The Constitution called for the coordination of these powers, but 
at the same time proclaimed their autonomous status. None of these branches was supposed 
to  prevail  over  any  of  the  other  two.  The  Constitution  provided  for  checks  and  balances 
intended to attain this objective. Of course, this ideal has been elusive for both the Legislative 
and the Judiciary. In practice, the executive branch gained a stronger stance in front of the 
other two due to informal mechanisms, especially in cases in which the President enjoyed a 
strong hold of the politics of the ruling party or coalition.  
The general belief among Bolivians is that the Presidency holds full powers. This was not the 
case according to the text of the Constitution, neither if compared to other presidencies which Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




enjoy powers, which in the case of Bolivia, were assigned to Congress. However, Bolivian 
presidents enjoyed a great deal of informal power, especially because they were also the ones 
who decided who would get into the list for Parliament of his/her own party. Once elected, 
allocations  of  budget  items  and  public  sector  positions  have  been  powerful  tools  to  gain 
influence  over  Congress.  In addition, Congressmen  were  not  experienced  people in public 
policy matters, and at the same time, they were not able to build strong parliamentary advisory 
bodies. 
In Bolivia´s recent history, each newly elected President has come from an opposing force to 
the ruling party. This fact has had a big impact on the PMP because, most of the time, the 
incoming  administrations have embarked in reversing  some policies or restructuring  others 
which were carried out by their predecessors. In doing so, politicians were acting guided by 
their own short term interests to remain in power and to discredit their opponents, rather than 
taking into consideration the long term progress of the country. 
The new Constitution has introduced changes in the organization of the State which call for the 
design  of  a  new  PMP.  The  former  Constitution  devised  a  country  ruled  by  a  central 
Government.  It  gave  autonomous  status  only  to  the  municipalities  under  very  well defined 
roles  and  a  revenue  sharing  mechanism.  At  present,  the  new  Constitution  allows  for  the 
formation of autonomous governments in those departments in which the inhabitants decide to 
adopt this form of government. It also grants the right to peasant and indigenous populations 
to  create  autonomous  governments  in  their  own  territories.  A  fourth  type  of  autonomous 
government  could    also  be  formed  by  grouping  municipalities  which  decide  to  unify  their 
territories  in  an  autonomous  region.  Each  autonomic  entity  has  its  own  governing  and 
deliberative  instances.  The  new  Constitution  stipulates  the  policy  areas  reserved  to  the 
national  level,  and  specifies  policy  domains  under  the  aegis  of  each  autonomous  level. 
Notwithstanding, the risks of overlapping competences has not been mitigated properly; there 
are still areas subject to different interpretations which leave the autonomous regime without 
any clear limits. Furthermore, not all autonomies will have the same structure; therefore, some 
missed  links  will  require  additional  regulation  in  order  to  promote  a  smooth  and  orderly 
functioning of the State. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




The  new  Constitution  puts  the State  at  the  center  of  the  development  process.  The  State 
should  conduct  the  economic  development  planning  with  the  participation  of,  and  in 
consultation with, the population. The general development plan provisions are mandatory to 
both the public and the private sector (Article 316). It also puts in the hands of the State the 
responsibility  to  command  and  control  the  exploration,  exploitation,  industrialization, 
transportation and marketing of all natural resources (Article 351), which are broadly defined 
comprising minerals, hydrocarbons, water, air, land, forest, biodiversity, the electromagnetic 
spectrum,  and  any  other  physical  elements  and  forces  with  the  potential  to  be  exploited 
(Article  348).  Furthermore,  private  participation  in  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources  is 
seriously  restricted  by  regulations  which  inhibit  the  free  disposition  of  profits  by  private 
investors  (Articles  351  and  355).  Hence,  the  new  PMP  has  to  cope  with  responsibilities 
beyond the administration of the state run companies, the ones which have been nationalized 
in the recent past, but with a host of new companies, some of them of recent creation, as is 
the case of a new airline, some factories to produce paper and cardboard and dairy plants 
across the country. Moreover, the new PMP has to define the allocation of resources to all the 
sectors comprised under the definition of natural resources. 
The new Constitution also establishes universal rights to access free primary, secondary and 
tertiary education (Article 17); free health care attention for the whole population (Articles 18 
and 35); the right to access to water supply, sewage, energy and telecommunications services 
provided by the State (Article 20), and the right to a minimum retirement pension financed by 
the State (Article 67). Although these rights could be interpreted as progressive in their nature, 
they have profound implications for the PMP at the national, regional and local levels. 
The new Constitution also establishes that civil society organizations will exert control over all 
State institutions and administrations, and over the quality of basic services (Article 241). The 
adoption of this form of supervision and, to a certain extent, of regulation, requires a careful 
design of ways to form these civil society organizations and the means by  which they will 
make their decisions enforceable. Such control mechanisms, unless properly embedded in the 
new formal PMP, could be detrimental to the allocation of resources in the economy. 
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c)  Civil Society Organizations 
Civil society organizations had different degrees of influence and/or participation in the policy 
making process in Bolivia. This participation has evolved over time from an isolated and issue 
specific involvement, to a more coalesced intervention in policies regarding national interests. 
It is useful to distinguish between, at least two different kinds of civil society organizations in 
Bolivia.  On  the  one  hand,  we  can  recognize  traditional  and  well  organized  entities  (labor 
unions, regional representations, business associations, and the like), and, on the other hand, 
there  are  recently born  and  less  formalized  organizations  with  a  great  degree  of  popular 
appeal  and  a  greater  capacity  to  aggregate  social  demands  (better  known  today  as 
“movimientos  sociales”  or  social  movements).  In  essence,  the  means  by  which  these 
organizations have sought their objectives has not changed over time, but it has taken forms 
that have become more radical in the recent past.  
•  Business Organizations 
Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia, (The Private Entrepreneurial 
Confederation) 
Founded in the early sixties, this organization has been influential in the political life and the 
PMP  of  Bolivia.  Before  democracy  was  re established  in  Bolivia,  corporatist  forms  of 
participation were the norm. Both business and labor organizations participated in the political 
life of Bolivia through their associations. In the case of the business community, their concerns 
were mostly related with sectoral rather than national interests. Relations with the government 
were  handled  without  any  political  intermediation,  and  have  proved  to  be  very  effective. 
Government  had  been  the  largest  contractor  in  the  economy,  until  the  reform  process; 
therefore,  an  intricate  network  of  relations  was  formed  with  politicians  and  government 
officials. Under these circumstances, there was very little interest in participating in the life of 
political parties, with obvious and commendable exceptions. 
Contrary  to  the  general  belief,  the  Bolivian  business  community  subtly  opposed  market 
reforms.  The  reform  process  opened  the  economy  to  international  trade  and,  therefore,  to 
competition by lowering tariffs to the lowest range in Latin America, and eliminating all non 
tariff barriers.  Public enterprises were either closed or handed over to the private sector, and 
economic policies tended to be neutral. These measures created a new landscape for the Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




business  community  by  fostering  competition  and  diminishing  government  procurement 
significantly. 
The reform process and conditions in the world economy have determined a regional shift in 
the center of power of the business community. During the State dominance of the economy 
and high international prices for minerals, Bolivia´s western entrepreneurs had a great deal of 
influence in the PMP. Nowadays, this center has moved to the east, to Santa Cruz, were the 
largest  private national and foreign  companies  are located. Business organizations´  whose 
main interests have been, most of the time, limited to specific sectoral issues. 
In recent years, this confederation has lost its influence. It has not been able to assemble one 
single voice. At present, business organizations from the prosperous eastern region of Bolivia 
do  not  participate  of the  national  confederation. The  present Government  is  proposing the 
reversal of market oriented reforms which ironically may bring government business relations 
to the way they were before the reform process, something that is welcome by some members 
of the business community. 
•  Labor organizations 
Labor  unions  have  a  long  tradition  in  Bolivia.  Although  most  of  them  were  created  under 
democratic regimes, their biggest influence in the PMP was developed during military regimes. 
Labor  associations  have  a  national  leading  entity;  however,  some  sectoral  or  regional 
organizations are of greater importance than their confederation. These organizations are non 
partisan, but their political slant is evident, labor organizations favor left leaning ideas, in the 
same  way  business  organizations  favor  right leaning  beliefs.  Labor  organizations  are 
concerned with both labor interests and national economic and political concerns.  
Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) (Bolivian confederation of labor unions) 
Founded in the early 50´s, it is one of the oldest organizations of civil society in Bolivia. It used 
to be one the most influential organizations during its political life. It has been concerned with 
issues beyond labor related interests. Although formal sector employment in Bolivia has been 
a small part of total employment, the COB has been a leading institution in the defense of 
democracy during the military regimes, and it was a firm opponent to the stabilization policies 
back in 1985. The lead of this confederation has changed hands over time. Miners were the 
most influential group until the collapse of tin prices in 1985 (until then, the most important Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




export item of Bolivia, run by a state owned enterprise); peasant organizations took the lead 
afterwards, until recently. After 2002, the COB, and in particular some regional branches of it, 
have re emerged as influential actors in the PMP. 
Confederación de Maestros de Bolivia (teacher’s labor union) 
Teachers account for almost one half of the public sector workforce in Bolivia. Urban and rural 
teachers belong to separate labor unions under one single confederation. This is a highly 
politicized organization. Most of the time teachers’ leaders came from political parties in the far 
left. They were at the center of the opposition to the educational reform passed by Congress 
back in 1994,  which  established, for the first time,  a bilingual  and intercultural  educational 
system. 
•  Regional organizations 
The further the region is located from the government’s seat, the greater the importance of 
regional organizations. To some extent, their strength is a reflection of the lack of attention the 
central government has given to these regions. Their main interests have been to get attention 
to local demands or to the execution of specific public investment projects, and to get a larger 
share of yearly budgets. However, in the measure that the political party system has lost its 
representation  capabilities,  regional  organizations  have  started  to  assume  strong  and 
influential stands on the overall political agenda of the country. 
These  entities  are,  nowadays,  the  leading  force  for  the  re organization  of  the  State  in  9 
autonomous regions. Some of them proposed a national referendum for this purpose, which 
was won in 4 out of 9 departments. After some years of intense debate on autonomies, today, 
there is almost national consensus in reforming the State into autonomies. Of course, there 
are  great  differences  in  the  way  these  autonomies  are  envisioned,  which  has  divided  the 
country into two clearly demarcated regions: the east and the west. 
 
Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz, (a regional civic committee)  
This  is  an  emblematic  organization  which  groups  almost  all  urban  and  rural  civic 
representations in the Santa Cruz region. It has been in existence for 58 years and has played 
a  decisive  role  to  get  a  royalty participation  for  Santa  Cruz  from  the  exploitation  of Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




hydrocarbons.  It  has  served  as  a  model  for  the  creation  of  similar,  although  not  equally 
successful,  civic  committees  in  all  9  departments  (regions)  of  Bolivia.  Today,  the  royalty 
system has become a State policy, applicable all over the country to hydrocarbons and mining 
activities. This entity is the leading force pushing for the re organization of the State into 9 
autonomous departments. 
 
A.3.  Non-institutionalized Actors 
Civil society organizations had different degrees of influence and/or participation in the policy 
making process in Bolivia. This participation has evolved over time from an isolated and issue 
specific involvement, to a more coalesced intervention in policies regarding national interests.  
These organizations have influenced policies in the recent past, and have contributed to turn 
around  the  PMP  in  Bolivia.  As  the  policy  agenda  moved  from  pure  stabilization  towards 
structural  reform,  to  a  large  degree  dependent  on  congressional  support,  civil  society 
organizations played a greater role (as supporting or opposing forces) but without any open 
recognition in the PMP. More recently, some of these organizations are at the center of the 
PMP, or at least hold an enormous power to approve or disapprove policies adopted by the 
executive. 
 
Confederación  de  Pueblos  Indígenas  de  Bolivia  (CIDOB)  (Indigenous  people 
confederation) 
Founded in 1982, by representatives of four ethnic groups living in the eastern part of Bolivia, 
this organization represents 34 indigenous groups, today, in seven out of the nine departments 
in Bolivia. This organization was one of the first to ask for a Constitutional Assembly in order to 
get the recognition of the different indigenous groups in Bolivia as nationalities other than the 
Bolivian nationality. It fought for land, especially for the original areas belonging to them as 
collective  property  before the  colonial  period, but  also,  before  the territory  was  devoted to 
extended agricultural cultivation. In the late 90´s, they marched hundreds of kilometers to La 
Paz, asking for their property rights. This march is regarded as a turning point in the influence 
of social movements to attain changes in public policies. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





Coordinadora del Agua  
This is an informal entity which grouped social movements in the city of Cochabamba in order 
to force the ejection of a foreign company which was granted the concession for the water 
supply  in  that  city.  In  the  year  2000,  after  months  of  negotiations,  conflicts  and  a  violent 
confrontation with the police in what was afterwards called “The War for Water”, this foreign 
company was expelled from Bolivia after 2 years of operations. Three years later, a similar 
movement  in  La  Paz  forced  the  termination  of  a  concession  contract  with  another  foreign 
company in charge of the water supply for the city of La Paz, after almost seven years of 
operations. The “War for Water” is a landmark in the ability of social movements to pursue 
sweeping changes in policies adopted by Government. The most extreme case of this type of 
mobilizations has been “The War for Gas” in October 2003, opposing an alleged intention of 
the Government to export gas through Chilean territory, a country with which Bolivia has had a 
centennial  claim  for  regaining  access  to  the  Pacific  coast,  lost  after  a  war.  This  time,  the 
outcome  was  the  fall  of  the  democratically elected  government  after  one  year  and  three 
months of its inauguration. 
 
Coca growers associations 
Almost 20 coca growers´ unions represent the interests of this sector in the countryside of 
Cochabamba and La Paz. Their immediate purpose has always been to curb coca eradication 
efforts  and  to  expand  the  areas  of  legal  coca  plantations.  Interestingly  enough,  these 
organizations have retained power and influence even at times when illegal coca plantations 
were almost eliminated. This sector is at the root of the Movimiento al Socialismo, the party 
currently in power. 
 
A.4.    External actors 
International  financial  institutions  and  official  aid  agencies  have  also  influenced  the  PMP. 
These institutions have used their financial leverage in support of policies which matched their Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




international aid agenda. Most of the time, however, it was possible to find a common ground 
with domestic agendas, contributing both to the reform process, but also to its reversal. 
 
A.5.  Arenas   
 
a)  Task Forces 
During the reform period, task forces outside the government formal structure were ad hoc 
teams of external and local advisors and policymakers, which worked on devising the reform 
strategy, to be presented to the President and the Cabinet. These task forces were extremely 
active in the stabilization period, and the first steps of the reform. Their role decayed later as 
the stabilization process consolidated itself, and the governments did not foster major reforms 
until the 1993 administration. 
 
b)  President’s inner circle 
The President´s Inner Circle comprised the President and its closest advisors, some of them 
members of cabinet. The importance of this arena varied sharply with different governments, 
being  a decisive stage sometimes where decisions were made, but in other administrations it  
lacked power completely. 
 
c)  The Cabinet 
The cabinet comprises the ministers which represent the main political allies of the governing 
coalition  and  independents.  In  the  stabilization  phase,  the  reforms  were  approved  by  the 
executive branch only, because of the nature of the reforms applied, and the need for swift 
action. When the reforms needed congressional approval, the cabinet sent the proposal to 
Congress, but if the coalition had secured a majority in the congress, then the approval in the 
cabinet assured the congressional approval as well. 
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d)  The Parliament 
The  parliament  had  the  power  to  block any  reform initiative, not  only  those  which  needed 
congressional approval. Therefore, it was important to have some control of Congress. This 
support was assured by the formation of a coalition. In the reform process, governability  was 
soon interpreted as having a coalition large enough to control the parliament. As explained in 
the main text, the parliament did not foster any major reform initiatives, and only few of its 
members had a deep understanding of the initiatives presented to it. The parliament (perhaps 
only with exception of regional laws), followed the decisions taken by the leaders of the ruling 
coalition. 
The role of Parliament has decreased over time, because the social movements found the way 
to  force  the  decisions  of  this  body.  The  parliament,  as  it  stands,  is  not  functional  to  the 
counter reform  process,  and  its  role  has  been  diminished.  The  virtual  elimination  of  the 
constitutional court was devised to reduce the role of the Parliament. 
 
e)  Institutionalized Bureaucracy 
After  the  first  generation  of  reforms,  the  task  forces  were  institutionalized  in  a  series  of 
independent  institutions  like  the  Central  Bank,  Superintendences,  etc.  The  public 
administration  was  professionalized  and  did  increase  its  voice  in  decision  making.  A  civil 
service  program  reinforced  this  process.  This  bureaucracy  had  a  very  important,  and 
sometimes, a leading role in the second generation set of reforms. The institutionalization of 
councils, where ministers and the bureaucracy met to examine and endorse economic policy 
measures  (for  example  the  council  for  economic  policy,  the  council  for  social  policy,  the 
macroeconomic group, etc.), was an important step to reinforce the technical and professional 
influence in the decisions. One of the objectives of the MAS administration is to dismantle the 
institutions which correspond to a neoliberal administration. It began by replacing government 
officials  which  were  part  of  former  administrations  with  public  servants  which  have  an 
ideological affinity with the new administration. It has also closed the offices of independent 
regulators  and  transferred  those  competences  to  sectoral  ministries.  Only  two  regulators 
(financial intermediation and hydrocarbons) remain as independent entities, and Central Bank 
independence was almost eliminated by the new constitution. Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 





f)  Assemblies and Streets 
 “Social movements” make their decisions, in “cabildos” (in which the people gather, without 
any formal affiliation) and labor unions in “general assemblies” (in which affiliated members of 
the labor union participate). In these arenas, the leaders set forth a proposal to the grass 
roots, which approve or reject it, most of the time by the vote of the majority. This decision is 
then summoned to the Executive. If the demand is rejected, social movements or labor unions 
begin a process of negotiation accompanied with protests in the streets, which becomes the 
central arena for a final policy definition. 
 
g)  Executive Branch 
The executive branch is a key player in the counter reform process. Since this process tries to 
impose  the  decisions  of  the  streets,  it  tries  to  circumvent  the  institutions  of  representative 
democracy,  especially  the  checks  and  balances  system.  Therefore,  the  process  tries  to 
concentrate  power  in  the  executive  branch.  The  executive  branch  is  engaged  in  a  very 
complex  relationship  with  the  social  movements,  in  which  sometimes  it  uses  these 
movements,  and  sometimes  the  social  movements  try  to  impose its  decisions  through the 
executive branch.  
 
h)  Constitutional Assembly 
Because the decision making mechanisms and institutions were designed to follow the rules of 
representative democracy, these are not functional to the “direct democracy” which proclaims 
the  counter reform  process.  Therefore,  a  constitutional  assembly  was  elected  to  try  to 
formalize  and institutionalize  a “direct  democracy”  system. After  two  years  of work  and no 
minor conflicts, the majority of the assembly approved a  new constitution draft. That text was 
afterwards modified to gain political support from certain political parties with congressional 
representation. A new version of the proposed constitution was submitted to the consideration 
of the electorate in a referendum which took place in January 2009. This new Constitution 
proclaims most of the postulates of the ruling party and in many respects does not reflect a Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




social pact for the times to come. Some of the problems that led to the de institutionalization of 
the PMP in Bolivia remain unaddressed and others have been amplified. For instance, the 
State will be organized into four different forms of autonomies, with potential overlapping of 
territorial spaces and competences and no mechanism devised to deal with such problems. 
The Constitution has established a one year term for the approval of the norms which will 
implement the Constitution (Fifth Transitory Disposition) after the election of the new Pluri 
national  Legislative  Assembly.  Therefore  it  is  very  likely,  that  in  the  early  stages  of  the 
implementation of the new constitution no formal PMP will be institutionalized for the design of 
public policies over the long run. 
 
 Mechanisms and Currencies 
 
a)  Congressional support 
The political coalition system in Congress proved to be a very effective mechanism to ensure 
governance, which was a necessary condition to maintain democratic and economic stability, 
and to implement the reform process. The reform process experienced significant advances in 
the 1985 1989 and 1993 1997 administrations, and slowed down between 1989 and 1993. 
The coalition system, however, experienced a deep process of exhaustion over time.  
The  coalition  system  lost  credibility  because  Congressional  coalitions  were  increasingly 
formed based on clientelistic objectives, and not on policy based agreements. In addition, the 
traditional political parties were accused of covering up corruption cases. At the same time, 
social movements and trade unions gained power and succeeded in unifying diverse sectoral 
demands under one single cause, which was the reversion of the structural market reforms. 
 
b)  Budget allocations 
Budget allocations were an effective tool to gain support for the ruling government policies. As 
explained earlier, members of Congress had an increased interest in gaining local and sectoral 
support. An effective way to do that was to fight for a greater share of public funds and to get 
financing for highly visible regional public investment projects. However, over budgeting was Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia  Final Version 




not a common practice; hence, the budget allocation process distorted to some degree the 
main  policy  objectives  of  the  Government.  The  extent  to  which  this  was  a  damaging 
phenomenon  depended  on  the  strength  of  the  main  political  party  of  the  coalition  and  its 
leader, i.e. the President. 
 
c)  Demonstrations  
As  Congress  and  political  parties  lost  their  representativeness  of  the  population,  citizen 
organizations were active and vocal in channeling their demands. These organizations were 
not part of the PMP (some instances of people participation operated only at the municipal and 
departmental levels, most of them co opted by the political parties). Therefore, their voice was 
only  heard  when  they  exerted  some  sort  of  pressure,  most  of  the  time  on  the  central 
government  and  sometimes  on  their  municipal  administration.  Road  blockades,  strikes, 
marches  and  hunger  strikes,  were  the  means  by  which  these  organizations  fought  and 
attained their objectives. These mechanisms have proven to be increasingly effective to the 
point of almost replacing the formal PMP. Since the social movements are now part of the 
MAS  administration,  the  Government  has  used  this mechanism to  its own  advantage. The 
passage of critical pieces of legislation has been attained by mobilizing political followers to lay 
siege on Congress until their objective is attained. 
 
d)  Conditionality 
Conditionality  was  a  means  by  which  international  financial  institutions  and  official  aid 
agencies gained support for their policy agenda. During most of the period under analysis, 
Bolivia was heavily dependent on foreign aid. During those regimes with a clear policy agenda, 
conditionality,  and  more  importantly,  cross conditionality  was  not  a  major  obstacle,  to  the 
contrary, it supported the implementation of the government´s policy agenda. However, as the 
coalition system lost coherence in the policy orientation, conditionality was a tool to implement 
donor preferences. 
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Policy-making Process in Bolivia over time 
Years 
Political Events  Actors 
Arenas and 
Currencies  Economic Events (Outcomes) 
 
1971-





￿  Armed Force 
￿  Entrepreneurial sector 
￿  Corporate Groups 
 
 
￿ Military dictatorship, 
decision imposed by 
the use of force 
￿ Political repression 
￿ Individual liberties 
and press control 
￿ State-controlled economic 
model  
￿ External indebtedness  
￿ High commodity prices 
￿ Export and commodity boom 






￿   End of the Banzer 
dictatorship 
￿   Political uncertainty 
and volatility 
￿  Attempts to return to 
democracy 
￿  Succession of short-
lived democratic and 
military governments 
￿  Exhaustion of the 
military regimes 
￿  Armed Force 
￿  Political Parties (MNR, 
ADN, UDP) 
￿  Trade Unions (COB) 







￿ Military dictatorship 
￿ Street demonstrations 
and protests 
￿ Hunger strikes 
￿ Congress and political 
parties 
￿ Economic crisis towards the 
end of the 70’s and  beginning 
of the 80’s 












Return to Democracy 










￿  Government (UDP) 
￿  Congress ( dominated 
by opposition parties, 
MNR and ADN) 
￿  Entrepreneurial sector 
￿  Trade Unions (COB) 
￿  Social movements 
￿  International financial 
organizations (IMF) 




￿ Street demonstrations 




￿ Hyperinflation and shortages 
of basic goods 
￿ Debt Crisis 
￿ Large fiscal deficit 
￿ Continuous GDP fall 
￿ Failed stabilization policies 
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Political Events  Actors 
Arenas  and 







￿  Paz Estenssoro 
government 
￿  First congressional pact 
to ensure Parliamentary 
majority and 
governance (MNR-AND) 
￿  Alternative 
Development strategy 
and Law 1008     
￿  Government 
(President and some 
Cabinet members) 
￿  Congress (political 
parties) 
￿  Corporative Groups 
￿  Trade Unions (COB) 






￿ Weak labor and social 
movements 
￿ Stabilization Policy package 
(D.S. 21060) 
￿ De-regulation of key markets 
(financial, exchange  and 
goods markets) 
￿ Labor market flexibilization 
￿ Opening of the economy to 
foreign trade 
￿ Tin crisis 
1989-
1993 
￿  Paz Zamora 
Government 
￿  Second congressional 
pact (ADN-MIR) 
￿  Congress (political 
parties) 




￿ Weak labor and social 
movements 










￿  Sánchez de Lozada first 
government 
￿  Third congressional 
pact to guarantee 
governance (MNR-UCS-
MBL) 
￿  Last pact around a 
coherent government 
program 
￿  Political Institutional 
reforms: 
￿  Constitutional reforms 
￿  Land reform (INRA 
Law) 
￿  New Electoral Law 
 
 
￿ Government (strong 
leadership of the 
President) 
￿ Congress (political 
parties) 
￿ Entrepreneurial sector 
￿ Transnational 
companies 
￿ Regional corporative 
groups 
￿ Bureaucracy 
￿ International Financial 
Organizations 
(IMF,WB,IDB) 
￿ Trade Unions (COB) 





￿ Social movements 
began to articulate 
 
￿ Plan de Todos (Plan for 
Everyone) 
￿ Second Generation Reforms 
￿ Institutional reforms 
￿ Central Bank autonomy 
￿ Privatization (capitalization) of 
public enterprises 
￿ Pension reform 
￿ Decentralization and 
municipalization of the public 
administration 
￿ Sectoral regulatory 
frameworks (SIREFI, SIRESE) 
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Political Events  Actors 
Arenas and 







￿  Fragmentation of the 
electoral vote 
￿  Need to form Mega-
coalitions to assure 
governance (AND-MIR-
NFR-UCS)  
￿  Increased political 
volatility  
￿  National Dialogue 
￿  Zero-Coca policy  
￿  War for water 
￿  Counter-reform process 
begins 
￿  Police force strike 
￿  March to Caracollo 
￿  Fragmentation of the 
PMP 
￿  Government (Banzer  - 
Tuto) 
￿  Congress (Political 
parties) 
￿  Civil society 
￿  Trade Unions (COB) 





￿  Corporative groups 
￿  NGOs 
￿  International Financial 
Organizations 
￿  Rural workers and 
Indian groups 
(CSUTCB-CIDOB) 
￿  Congress with 
increased opposition 




￿  Road and street 
blockades 
￿  Attempts to channel 
social sector 
demands through 
the National Dialog 
￿ Large foreign capital inflows 
owing to the reform process 
￿ International crisis out-brake 
￿ Large fiscal deficit 
￿ Pro-cyclical policies 
￿ Custom Law 
￿ Zero-Coca policy 
￿ Strict financial regulation and 
credit crunch 
￿ HIPC  II 











￿ Increased fragmentation 
of the electoral vote 
￿ Sanchez de Lozada second 
term 
￿ Alliance between former 
antagonist parties (MNR–
MIR–NFR) 
￿ Black February 
￿ Black October (War for 
Gas) 
￿ Overthrow of GSL 
government  
￿  Weakened 
Government Alliance 
￿  Congress (weakened 
coalition of traditional 
political parties) 
￿  Congress (emerging 
opposition political 
parties-MAS) 
￿  Social Movements 
coca producers, Indian 
groups, neighbor 
organizations   





￿ Strong opposition to 
reforms in Congress 
(MAS) 




blockades and street 
demonstrations) 
￿ Deepening of economic crisis 
(increased fiscal deficit, credit 
crunch and slower growth)  
￿ Failed attempt to recover the 
reform process (BONOSOL,  
SUMI,  Capitalization) 
￿  Failed economic adjustment 
measures  (tax on personal 
income) with high political 
costs 
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Political Events  Actors 
Arenas  and 







￿  Constitutional 
succession (Mesa 
government) 
￿  Gas Referendum 
￿  Resignation of CMG and 
call for new elections 
￿  Break down of PMP 






￿  Weak government 
with no congressional 
representation 
￿  Divided Congress 
opposed to the 
government 
￿  Regions (Santa Cruz) 












￿  Continuous 
confrontations 
between Government 
and Regions (Santa 
Cruz and Tarija) and 
regional “cabildos”  
￿  Road blockades and 
street 
demonstrations by 
labor and social 
movements 
￿ Partial economic recovery 
￿ Attempts to reduce the fiscal 
deficit (tax regularization, tax 
on financial transactions, 
domestic fuel price increases) 
￿ Reversal of reforms accelerate 
￿ New Hydrocarbons Law (50% 
Royalties) 
￿ Unilateral termination of the 
contract with Aguas del 








￿  General elections with 
direct election of 
regional authorities 
(Prefectos) 
￿  Landslide victory of Evo 
Morales 
￿  Constitutional Assembly 
(process) 




￿  Referenda for regional 
autonomies in regions 
opposed to the 
government 
 
￿  Government (with 
strong Presidential 
leadership - Morales) 
￿  Congress (lower 
chamber controlled by 
the government and 
upper chamber by the 
opposition)  
￿  Prefectos-Regions and 
regional organizations 
￿  Constitutional 
Assembly 
￿  Trade Unions (COB) 
and social movements 
(coca producers, 
miners and Indian 
movements) 
￿ Government approves 
nationalizations by 
Supreme Decrees 
￿ Senate does not pass 
laws set forth by the 
government 
￿ Regions carried out 
referenda to deepen 
autonomic processes 
￿ Constitutional 
Assembly approves a 
Constitution without 
the support of the 
opposition 
￿ Commodity price boom 




￿ Populist economic policies 
￿ Government’s National 
Development Plan outlines the 
strategy to reverse market-
oriented reforms 
￿ Inflationary pressures and 
exchange rate appreciation 
￿ Reduced FDI flows  
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Classification of Political Parties used in the Paper 
Political Party Not Classified Systemic Antisystemic
ACP X      
ADN X      
ADN-PDC X      
AND-NFR-PDC X      
AP X      
ARBOL X
ARENA X      
ASD X      





FNP X      
FPU X      
FREPAB X
FSB X      
FULKA X





MCC X      




MIR-NM X      
MKN X
MNR X      
MNR - MRTKL X      
MNR-MBL X      
MNRI X
MNRI-1 X
MNRV X      
MRTK X
MRTKL X
NFR X      
PDB X      
PDC X      





UCS-FSB X      
UN X      
USTB X
VR-9 X      
VSB X
Doble entries correspond to different elections.
Classification of Political Parties Used in the Document
Annex B
 